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The Impact of Sentencing Length on the Recidivism of Serious Violent Offenders: 
An Exploratory Analysis of Pennsylvania Data 1997-2001
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2004 former Attorney General John Ashcroft, while announcing a new 
Violent Crime Reduction Initiative, said:
“The violent-crime rate has plunged to the lowest level in 30 years, but we 
view these impressive results as just the beginning.  We are determined to 
drive down violent crime everywhere – especially in those places where 
habitual offenders are concentrated and communities live in fear of the 
violent and predatory …Our goal is to make an immediate impact in these 
communities by targeting repeat offenders with tough prosecutions, and 
tough sentences” (USDOJ Press Release June 2004)
Despite the fact that violent crime has experienced decreases in the last 30 years, 
politicians like former Attorney General Ashcroft continue to call for stiffer sentences 
to combat violent crime, especially crime committed by habitual offenders.  In the 
past 30 years, while violent crime rates have experienced periods of decrease, 
incarceration rates have skyrocketed (Beckett and Sasson 2000).  This unprecedented 
expansion of incarceration can be traced to policy changes enacted to do what 
Attorney General Ashcroft and other politicians are calling for, tougher sentences for 
violent offenders.  
To politicians, recidivism is important because it presents a direct threat to 
public safety and is significant in the development, maintenance, and revision of 
correctional policy.  If the recidivism rate is low, a policy is viewed as deterring 
habitual offenders.  If a correctional program or policy reflects a high rate of 
recidivism, or a rate equal to recidivism rates for alternative interventions, the 
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program is considered ineffective in reducing recidivism (Smith & Akers 1993). The 
question remains, do stiffer sentences reduce the rate at which people become re-
involved in crime?
Habitual violent offenders have been targeted by state sentencing 
commissions to receive relatively severe sentences (Kramer & Ulmer 2002).  By and 
large the justifications given for these sentences are just deserts, incapacitation and 
most notably deterrence.  To date there is no concrete evidence that stiffer sentences
deter violent offenders.  There have been several studies that address issues of the 
deterrent effect of sentence severity. These studies offer contradictory findings.  
Some found that the length of sentence has no impact on the rate of recidivism (see 
Baumer 1997 for a detailed list).  Recently at least one study (Dejong 1997) has 
shown that sentence severity (as measured by sentence length) affects the timing of 
recidivism for habitual offenders.  
Politicians have taken it upon themselves to increase the incarceration penalty 
paid by serious violent offenders.  This direction is not supported by the research on 
sentence severity and recidivism.  Most studies show that sentence severity has no 
effect on recidivism rates, and some even demonstrate that more severe sentences 
actually increase the probability of recidivism. 
The current research is an attempt to answer the question whether tougher 
sentences have a specific deterrent effect and decrease the probability of recidivism. 
First, this study will review the state of general and specific deterrence literature.  
Second, I explore the current state of knowledge regarding recidivism and what 
factors increase the probability of recidivism.  Also I will discuss the limitations of 
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past research such as omitted variable bias. Third, I will focus on the recent studies 
that have attempted to control for the selection bias associated with offenders who are 
given severe sentences.  I will also discuss alternative theories to explain the findings 
of prior studies.  Fourth, I will introduce the use of instrumental variable estimation in 
order to correct for omitted variable bias.  After discussing the proposed instrument, 
the research questions and the data used in this study will be described.  Fifth, I will 
present the findings of this study and discuss the methodological and substantive 
conclusions.  Finally I will discuss the policy implications of the findings.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW OF GENERAL 
DETERRENCE RESEARCH
From the time of Beccaria (1763), the idea of deterrence has been central to 
the formation and operation of criminal justice systems all over the world.  The 
notion that swi ft, certain and severe punishments are more effective in deterring 
people from committing crime is still popular today because it is intuitive and
resonates with citizens.  Though deterrence is logical, it is a theory that has driven
much criminal justice policy without firm empirical evidence.    It was not until the 
1960’s when Tittle (1969) and others proposed a concrete way to analyze deterrence 
that empirical research in this area really began.  
Some criminologists attempted to distinguish between certainty, severity and 
celerity to determine which of these characteristics of punishment was the most 
important in terms of deterrence (Chiricos and Waldo 1970). According to Chiricos 
and Waldo (1970), Gibbs lead the way by operationalizing certainty and severity of 
punishment. Certainty was measured as the ratio of the number of offenders 
convicted of homicide to the number of homicides known to police.  Severity was 
measured as the median number of months served by persons for homicide.   Gibbs 
concluded in his analysis that “no evidence exists of a relationship between legal 
reactions to crime and the crime rate’” (Chiricos and Waldo 1970).  Tittle (1969) also 
sought to investigate whether penal sanctions deter crime.  Using similar 
operationalizations as Gibbs and using the seven Federal Bureau of Investigations 
(FBI) index offenses, he found that when the index offenses were considered 
together, certainty of punishment had a negative relationship on rates of deviance;
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whereas severity of punishment had a positive relationship with rates of deviance for 
all index offenses except homicide. Tittle (1969) thus concluded that severity of 
punishment alone was irrelevant to the control of deviance as measured by crime 
rates.
Since these two early studies were conducted, the research designs, quality of 
data used, and theoretical questions asked of deterrence have all increased in 
sophistication.  Nevertheless, the message regarding severity of punishment in 
general deterrence remained relatively constant (see Nagin 1978 for a comprehensive 
review of this literature).  In a review of the research, Nagin (1978) concluded that 
recidivism is not affected by varying the severity of punishments. Paternoster (1987) 
has also drawn similar conclusions.  After some early research, those employing 
aggregate-level data found no consistent inverse relationship between crime rates and 
objective levels of punishment severity.  Thus, early objective deterrence studies 
consistently found little support for use of severe sentences as a means to reduce 
recidivism.  Because of these less than optimistic findings, research on sentence 
severity lay dormant for some time. It was not until perceptual deterrence became in 
vogue that research on sentence severity began to reemerge. 
The research on perceptual and general deterrence, while enlightening, does 
not address whether individuals convicted of a crime will be deterred based on the 
severity of sanctions they receive.
“ … it is suggested that future empirical research on the question of 
deterrence should not be based upon available macroscopic data.  
Rather, an attempt might be made to follow a number of individuals’
cases through the criminal justice system to determine celerity, 
severity and certainty of punishment, and to assess the impact of that 
6
punishment upon behavior of the individuals and of his peers and 
significant others.” (Chiricos & Waldo 1970, pg 215)
While the current research cannot address all the issues articulated by Chiricos and 
Waldo (1970), I do attempt to at least fill in the void regarding the severity of 
punishment and its impact on the future behavior of individuals.
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III. LITERATURE ON SPECIFIC DETERRENCE,
RECIDIVSM AND SENTENCE LENGTH
From the studies cited above, one might be led to conclude that severity of 
sentence is not important in deterring offenders on a macro level, but what about on 
an individual level? Simple specific deterrence theory proposes that individual 
offenders who have experienced a harsh sanction are more likely to desist from future 
offending compared to those who experience a less severe sanction (Dejong 1997)1.
A substantial body of research has developed on recidivism and specific deterrence.  
Below is a brief description of some of that research as well as an analysis of the 
empirical evidence to date.  I will also endeavor to raise some questions that still 
remain to be answered.
Recidivism
What do we know about recidivism? First, available evidence from the United 
States shows that about 35-45% of persons released from prison are reconvicted 
within six years of being released (Baumer 1997: 608).  Second, measuring 
recidivism as specific deterrence is problematic.  Research in the past has used 
various methods of operationalizing recidivism.  The two most common methods are 
either analyzing subsequent arrests or using a new conviction as a measure of failure.  
1 Though, this is the most often tested version of specific deterrence theory (Dejong 1997, Spohn & 
Holleran 2002 etc) some scholars question whether specific deterrence actually posits that 
experiencing a sanction will reduce the likelihood of future offending by the one who experienced the 
sanction.   Rather, they maintain that it is the threat of a severe sanction that plays the biggest role in 
the cost benefit analysis when a potential offender entertains the thought of committing an offense.  
That threat is what deters, not the actual experience of a punishment. This perspective would argue that 
severe sanctions would have a greater deterrent effect on others who now perceive the costs of 
engaging in crime as greater due to the sever sanction experienced by another person.
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Both have disadvantages.  Using rearrest as a measure of failure is a more liberal 
measure, but it may be inaccurate because offenders may be labeled by law 
enforcement and thus may become the “usual suspects” in crimes in their area.  This 
bias may result in offenders, who are trying to desist, being constantly brought before 
the criminal justice system.  Convictions, on the other hand, are a more conservative 
measure of recidivism.  All the cases that presumably have no merit will not make it 
to the conviction stage of the criminal justice process.  Conversely, cases where the 
defendant is guilty, but not prosecuted because of lack of evidence would also fall 
through the criminal justice cracks.  In some states when an offender is already on 
parole and commits a new offense, rather than prosecute the new offense, the 
offender gets re-admitted to prison due to a parole violation.  There are certainly 
errors with both measures of recidivism; previous research on the reliability of arrests 
versus convictions indicates that arrests may be preferable to convictions because use 
of arrest minimizes potential errors better than use of convictions (Woodredge 1988).  
Third, the research on recidivism is difficult to synthesize because there have 
been a multitude of studies that measure many different aspects of the recidivism 
question.  Recidivism studies can be divided into several categories: studies that deal 
with juvenile offenders (Wooldredge 1988: Auerhahn 1999; and Corrado et. al. 
2003), studies that deal with different types of offenses (i.e. white collar, Weisburd et. 
al. 1995; or drug offenses Hepburn & Albonetti 1994; and Spohn & Holleran 2002), 
and studies that compare different kinds of interventions like electronic monitoring 
(Gainey et. al 2000), intermediate sanctions such as house arrest (Smith & Akers 
1993), or combinations of parole, prison and treatment programs (Wooldredge 1988; 
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and Hepburn & Albonetti 1994). From these and other studies, there has developed a 
credible list of factors that can be called predictors of recidivism.
In a study assessing the impact of 12 juvenile court dispositions in eliminating 
recidivism for 2,083 offenders in four Illinois jurisdictions, Wooldredge (1988) found 
that serious offenders are more likely to recidivate regardless of the sentence 
imposed. Regarding sentence severity, his analysis showed that longer sentences 
coincide with higher recidivism rates.
“These results do not overwhelmingly support the idea that longer terms 
of detention are generally harmful to specific deterrence, but they do 
suggest that longer terms of detention are not superior to shorter terms for 
reducing recidivism, and that in some cases it may be counterproductive.  
This recommends that if some term of detention is imposed, it should be 
limited to short terms (Wooldredge 1988: 283).”  
He also found that county of residence holds the highest significance for explained 
variation in recidivism rates followed by gender, prior record, race, grade point 
average and learning disabilities. 
Visher et. al. (1991) found similar results in their study of serious juvenile
offenders.  They analyzed data obtained from the California Youth Authority between 
July 1981 and June 1982 for 1,949 male offenders.  From prior research, they choose
to control for such variables as criminal history, current commitment, substance 
abuse, school problems, family background and environment.  About 80% of the 
sample was rearrested during the 3 year follow up period.  The average time to failure 
was 306 days.  The variables that were significant in predicting recidivism were
criminal history, current offense, youth’s substance abuse, school problems, family 
background characteristics, county level property, violent crime, crime clearance 
rates, and county of commitment for each subject. Prior violent behavior and family 
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problems (family violence and parents who are criminals) failed to influence time to 
rearrest. 
With respect to the factors that influence recidivism, Wooldredge (1988) and 
Visher et. al (1991) provide factors that have been supported by much research since 
then. In his criminal career research, Greenberg (1991) shows that the major 
correlates of recidivism are race, age and gender. Minorities, the young, and males 
are all more likely to recidivate. Hepburn & Albonetti (1994) also find that gender, 
race, age and prior record significantly affect juvenile recidivism. In a summary of 
prior research, Baumer concludes that recidivism rates vary by offender and offense 
characteristics, including age and gender of the offender, the crime type, and 
offender’s criminal record.  Research in the U.S., England, Canada and Australia, has 
consistently shown that recidivism rates decrease with the age of the offender, are 
higher for males, and higher for those convicted of property offenses than among 
violent offenses.  Also of importance is that the likelihood of recidivism increases 
with a longer criminal history.  A smaller body of research finds that the risk of 
recidivism is slightly lower among those who are married and those who have higher 
levels of education (Baumer 1997).
The above list of factors appears to be consistent even in different cultures.  In 
Baumer’s (1997) study of recidivism in Malta from 1976-1994, 1,230 inmates 
released from Malta’s only prison are followed for several years.  Baumer (1997) 
demonstrates that even in a vastly different society, the predictors of recidivism are 
more or less the same.  Malta is a highly integrated society with strong social 
structural institutions of family, church and polity.  There is a strong sense of 
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community identity, commitment to the conventional family, and adherence to 
religious morals and values. In this community context, Baumer finds that gender, 
age, number of previous convictions, offense type, and length of confinement are 
significantly related to the risk of re-imprisonment.  Interestingly, Baumer (1997) 
discovers that in Malta persons who serv ed longer sentences were less likely to be re-
convicted. This last finding is contrary to many years of recidivism research 
conducted in the U.S. and other western societies.
The majority of studies in the U.S. and England say that length of 
confinement has little or no effect on the likelihood of recidivism while other studies 
report that persons who serve longer prisons terms are more likely to recidivate. “The 
ambiguity of prior research on the relationship between length of confinement and 
recidivism rates may be due to inconsistencies in controlling for various demographic 
and criminal history characteristics, or it may be that the relationship is nonlinear” 
(Baumer 1997, pg 609). Future research needs to be able to control for the various 
demographic and criminal history characteristics and the possibility of non-linear 
relationships in order to make a significant impact on the study of recidivism.  The 
present study will attempt to make such a contribution.  First I will explore what 
previous research has to say about the relationship between sentence length and 
recidivism.
Sentence Severity and Sentence Length
Most of the past research on sentence severity concerns itself with measuring 
the impact of incarceration versus probation and other sanctions on recidivism (Spohn 
& Holleran 2002; Weisburd et. al. 1995; Smith & Akers 1993) rather than measuring 
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the impact of sentence length on recidivism.  These studies reveal that imprisonment 
does not have a significant deterrent effect and, in fact, may even have a criminogenic 
effect and increase the probability of recidivism (Spohn & Holleran 2002).  
One such study was conducted by Weisburd et. al. (1995).  They studied a 
sample of white collar offenders because these offenders are generally believed to be
more influenced by penal sanctions and are thought of as more rational than common 
law violators.  They examine the impact of the predicted probability of imprisonment
on 742 offenders convicted of white collar crimes in seven U.S. districts from 1976-
1978.  Half of the sample received a prison sentence (N=368), but nearly all of them 
served less than two years in prison.  These offenders were followed for 10.5 years. 
The authors calculated differences in the likelihood of recidivism between a prison 
group and a no prison group.  They controlled for various indicators that might affect
recidivism such as prior record, type of conviction, district of conviction, 
demographic characteristics, amount of victimization, role in the offense, etc.  
In general, it took this sample of white collar offenders a long time to 
recidivate, an average of over 3 years until they had a subsequent rap sheet entry.  
Weisburd and his colleagues determined that there was no significant difference in 
the recidivism rates of those who received prison sentences and those who did not.  In 
fact, model estimates revealed that those in the prison sample had slightly higher 
failure rates than those in the no-prison sample though none of these were statistically 
significant.  
While this might seem to be compelling evidence that prison does not have a 
specific deterrent impact upon the likelihood of rearrest, these results must be 
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interpreted with caution.  It has widely been acknowledged in the criminological 
literature that there is some inherent selection bias in many studies that attempt to 
predict deterrence or recidivism comparing probationers and incarcerated offenders.  
The probability of receiving a sentence of incarceration is not random (Smith & 
Paternoster 1990).  Offenders who receive longer sentences for a specific crime differ 
from other offenders who receive a less severe sentence.  They have other 
characteristics that are assumed to predispose them to recidivism, for example, longer 
criminal histories, the severity of the current offense, offender attitudes, amenability 
to treatment or stakes in conformity, etc (Weinrath & Gartrell 2001; Smith and 
Paternoster 1990).  Weisburd et al.(1995) attempt to control for selection bias by 
matching offenders and using multivariate statistical models to control for extraneous 
variables.  This is problematic because some of the variables that correlate with future 
offending when estimating the relationship between court sanctions and subsequent 
offending may have been left out of the analysis. Failure to take into account some of 
these factors may have weighty consequences for conclusions drawn concerning the 
association between sanctions and future offending (Smith & Paternoster 1990). 
When key variables are omitted from the regression equation, a biased and 
inconsistent estimator of the true slope parameter will result.  Omitted variable bias is 
perhaps the most significant problem facing theorists who want to understand the 
impact of incarceration on future offending behavior.
Dejong (1997) also tested the propositions of specific deterrence theory.  Data 
were obtained from 4,505 male offenders incarcerated in the Manhattan central 
booking facility of the New York City Jail between April and October of 1984.  
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Using multivariate analysis she examined the effect of a custodial sentence on time 
until re-arrest controlling for an individual’s stake in conformity and type of offender, 
first time or experienced.  Due to the nature of the New York court system, Dejong 
had to restrict her analysis to less serious offenders who were tried in criminal court 
because the more serious offenders are automatically transferred to the Superior 
Court system.  Also Dejong has no precise measures of sentence length;  instead she 
uses both the length of time sentenced to prison for the offense as well as one third 
the number of days sentenced to incarceration as a proxy for actual time served.  She 
controls for demographic variables, offending history, current charge type, drug test 
result as well as some incident related variables (felony, property offense, violent 
offense etc.) stakes in conformity, and social bonds.
After a three year follow-up period, she concludes that it is unrealistic to 
expect incarceration to have a universal deterrent effect on all offende rs. Instead
offenders respond differently to incarceration and it would seem that incarceration 
stimulates restrictive and not absolute deterrence.  Confinement seems to increase 
subsequent offending of naïve offenders, while experienced offenders are no more or 
less likely to recidivate following incarceration.  Though, longer prison sentences do 
seem to lead to a longer time until re-offending for experienced offenders.  
This study is important because it builds upon the work of Weisburd et. al. 
(1995) by articulating reasons why some offenders sentenced to prison are more 
likely to recidivate than others. Also she adds to the empirical evidence that 
incarceration in and of itself is not a universal deterrent.  Perhaps her most significant 
contribution is the discovery that sentence length does have an effect on the timing of 
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recidivism.  But because Dejong groups offenders into naïve and experienced, the 
reader cannot make any inference as to what type of offenders are more likely to 
recidivate.  According to her definition a naïve offender can be anyone from a small 
time thief to a high level drug distributor being arrested for his first offense.  Most 
policies that are increasing incarceration time are targeted to serious violent 
offenders, a group which Dejong cannot address.
A study that attempts to address some of the limitations of the above studies is 
the study of the effect of imprisonment on recidivism rates of felony drug offenders 
by Spohn and Holleran (2002).  The authors of this study collected data on 1,077 
felony offenders in Jackson County, Missouri who were convicted in 1993.  They 
compared those who were given probation to those who were sentenced to 
imprisonment for three types of offenders, drug offender, drug-involved offenders 
and non-drug offenders.  The indicators of recidivism analyzed were a new file 
charged, a new conviction, or a return to jail or prison, and they also measured the 
time-to-failure in months.  They controlled for some extraneous variables including 
the sentence type (probation or prison), the type of offender, gender, race, 
employment status, age, and number of prior felony convictions.
Through their analysis, Spohn and Holleran found that for each measure of 
recidivism prisoners had higher rates than probationers.  They were significantly 
more likely to be charged with a new offense, convicted of a new offense and be 
sentenced to prison for a new offense. The probability of recidivism was not affected 
by employment status or predicted probability of incarceration. They state that 
“Contrary to deterrence theory, offenders who were sentenced to prison failed more 
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quickly, in terms of being arrested and charged with a new offense, than offenders 
who were placed on probation.  Recidivism also occurred more quickly for men, 
blacks, younger offenders, and offenders with more serious prior records,” (pg. 345).  
Before such strong claims as these can be accepted on face value, it is prudent to 
examine the authors’ analytic strategy. 
Like Weisburd et. al. (1995), these authors recognize that offenders sentenced 
to prison are qualitatively different from those sentenced to probation. A judge’s 
determination of the proper punishment reflects factors related to offender’s 
seriousness and risk of recidivism.  “Although our models control for offender 
characteristics that are linked to these assessments, they do not control for all of the 
factors that judges take into account in determining an offender’s dangerousness and 
risk of recidivism,” (Spohn & Holleran 2002, pg. 340). To attempt to control for these 
factors, they model the offender’s predicted probability of imprisonment.  Individuals
predicted probability of incarceration was estimated controlling for seriousness of the 
instant offense, number of prior convictions, offender’ prior criminal record, 
offenders’ probation status at time of instant offense, whether the offense involved a
weapon, the mode of conviction (guilty plea or trial), type of attorney, pretrial status, 
and demographic variables.  
The authors’ attempt at predicting the decision to incarcerate is a step in the 
right analytical direction.  But the authors did not use Berk’s (1983) procedures 
appropriately.  Their attempt to control for selection bias fails to take into account 
that the instruments they are using to model the decision to incarcerate are not 
exogenous.  Some of the variables are directly correlated with recidivism.  As 
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previous research has demonstrated, prior criminal record, offender’s background, 
race, gender, age, marital status and drug use are all significantly related to recidivism 
(Spohn & Holleran 2002; Greenberg 1991; Baumer 1997; and Visher et. al. 1991).
Also, because this study predicts the probability of incarceration rather than actual 
sentence length, it does not address the issue of whether increased sentence lengths 
themselves impact recidivism.
Spohn and Holleran (2002) declare that their results are contrary to specific 
deterrence theory, but this assertion is based on the assumption that specific 
deterrence theory posits an unambiguous negative relationship between sentence 
length and recidivism.  In reality specific deterrence theory suggests that the effect of 
incarceration length can be positive or negative depending on how the sanction is 
experienced by the offender (Gainey et al. 2000; Orsagh and Chen 1989).  If the 
specific deterrence effect is positive then that effect will diminish as sentence length 
increases suggesting a curvilinear U-shaped effect (Orsagh and Chen 1988, Cook 
1980).  
Nonlinearity and Recidivism
How does sentence length work differently for different types of offenders? 
Why would there be an expected curvilinear u-shaped relationship between 
incarceration length and recidivism?  Dejong’s (1997) study reiterates previous 
research findings that suggest that the effect of sentence length on recidivism can
vary for different types of offenders, i.e. naïve versus experienced offenders, young 
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versus old, male versus female etc.   This suggests that the association between time 
served and recidivism is more complicated than it appears at first glance.  
Gottfredson et al. (1977) analyzed parole outcomes for a sample of men and 
women paroled in Ohio.  They found that for a few specific classifications of 
offenders, time served was not related to parole outcome, but for other classifications 
there were complex patterns of association between sentence length and parole 
outcomes (Gottfredson et al. 1977).  When they examine the total sample of parolees, 
the overall trend appeared to be with increasing time served, up to 50 months or 
more, the recidivism rate increased.  After 50 months the recidivism rate decreased
somewhat.  After partitioning the sample into different subgroups based on Predictive 
Attribute Analysis, they find that there is no consistent pattern of increasing parole 
success associated with increased time served.  Some subgroups had increased 
recidivism with increased time served, while another group experienced no difference 
in recidivism rates with increased time served. One group experienced decreased 
recidivism with increased sentence length and while another group experienced both 
increases and decreases of recidivism with increases in sentence length (Gottfredson 
et al. 1977). They then examined offenders who had been convicted of robbery and 
burglary (the two crimes which represented most of the incarcerated sample).  Once 
again, the recidivism of these two groups of offenders was very different from one 
another. Robbers were more likely to recidivate with increased sentence length and 
the relationship was linear.  For burglars, the relationship was nonlinear and those 
given shorter sentences were less likely to recidivate, especially young offenders 
given short sentences. 
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In addition to Gottfredson et al.’s (1977) research, Orsagh and Chen (1988) 
also add to the confusion regarding sentence length and recidivism. The theory they 
test posits that the specific deterrence effect of sentence length dominates other 
effects (i.e. social bonding, and employment) when the time served is relatively low.
The additive effects of the lack of social bonds and disconnection from employment 
opportunities post release become more powerful than specific deterrent effects when 
time served is relatively long. They conclude that “different offender groups respond 
differently to different interventions, whether the intervention be a rehabilitation 
program, employment in prison industry – or time served,” (1988, p. 166). When 
offenders are analyzed together in one large sample, these group differences may be 
obscured.
While the focus of the current study is not to determine subgroup differences 
in recidivism, it is crucial to remember that sentence length may not have the same 
impact on recidivism for different groups of offenders. Since I plan to examine the 
recidivism of a total sample of violent offenders, I recognize that different subgroups 
have different recidivism trajectories and that these multiple trajectories can manifest 
themselves in a curvilinear relationship between time served and recidivism when 
examining offenders in the aggregate.  Most of the recent studies (Dejong 1997; 
Spohn & Holleran 2002) of sentence severity have failed to take non-linearity into 
account. The current study will test for non-linearity by including a squared function 
of time served to the model equations.  This is especially important given the fact 
that based on data limitations; the current study is unable to classify offenders into 
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meaningful subgroups. Based on the results from the reviewed studies, I expect that 
the relationship between sentence length and recidivism will be non-linear.  
An examination of the handful of studies that have looked specifically at 
sentence length gives a glimpse of the puzzle that still remains regarding this issue.  Is 
sentence severity unrelated to future offending as prior research in the U.S. has 
suggested?  Or are these results simply reflecting the fact that more serious offenders,
who receive longer prison sentences, are more likely to recidivate based on some 
underlying propensity to offend that is not related to the sanction?  Also, research 
suggests that different types of offenders experience time served differently and thus 
their recidivism rates also differ as a result (Dejong 1997; Gottfredson et al. 1977).
Many policy decisions are based on the version of specific deterrence that rests on the 
assumption that there is a negative relationship between sanction severity and future 
criminal activity (Orsagh & Chen 1988).  But recall that the effect of specific 
deterrence may be positive or negative based on how the offender experiences the 
sanction.  Specific deterrence is only one of several theoretical frameworks that 
attempt to explain the relationship between sentence severity and recidivism.  
Alternative Theoretical Explanations 
Prisonization
Different theoretical perspectives predict differing effects for the impact of 
time served on recidivism.  Orsagh and Chen (1988) proposed that specific deterrence 
may operate for certain types of offenders who receive relatively short sentences.  
This is a perspective supported by other research (Dejong 1997, Gainey et al. 2000). 
As sentence length increases the effects may differ from the effects produced by 
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shorter sentences. There is a criminological perspective that views institutions as 
“schools of crime”.  It follows that the more time an offender spends in this school of 
crime the more opportunity s/he has to learn to be a better criminal and consequently 
post-institutional criminal activity will increase.  Donald Clemmer (1950) was one of 
the first sociologists to articulate this idea.  He coined the term “prisonization” –
which is a process similar to assimilation in which the codes, norms, myths and 
dogma in prisons are absorbed by inmates.  
According to Clemmer (1950), prisons have their own culture and every 
inmate undergoes prisonization to some degree.  The social world of a prison is 
described in the following way:
Trickery and dishonesty overshadow sympathy and cooperation.  Such 
cooperation as exists is largely symbiotic in nature.  Social controls are 
only partially effective.  It is a world of individuals whose daily 
relationships are impersonalized.  It is a world of “I,” “me,” and 
“mine,” rather than “ours,” “theirs,” and “his.” Its people are thwarted, 
unhappy, yearning, resigned, bitter, hating, revengeful. Its people are 
improvident, inefficient, and socially illiterate.  The prison world is a 
graceless world.  There is filth, stink and drabness; there is monotony 
and stupor.  There is disinterest in work.  There is desire for love and 
hunger for sex.  There is pain in punishment.  Except for the few, there 
is bewilderment.  No one knows the dogmas and codes 
notwithstanding, exactly what is important (Clemmer 1950, 314).
It is not simply the assimilation process of prisonization that is of importance, it is 
those influences that deepen anti-social beliefs.  As a result of being in prison the 
inmate learns to reject society and accept a new images of themselves as a criminal.  
In an empirical test of Clemmer’s propositions, Wheeler finds that
prisonization does occur.  Inmates restore their self esteem by participating in a 
system that enables them to reject the people that have rejected them (Wheeler 1961).  
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He points out that the effects of prisonization are most apparent just prior to release.  
As an inmate prepares to leave the institution, s/he begins to shed their prison persona 
and look towards coping post-release.  This may be where prisonization has its most 
deleterious effects.  By shedding the rigid adherence to the prison code, inmates have 
to contend with the rejecting feelings that the prison code enabled them to discount.  
As they turn their attention to the outside, they have to make contacts with employers 
and relatives, while their status as offenders remains the same (Wheeler 1961). It is 
the reaction of society to offenders just released.  When they are not accepted and 
find it difficult to find work, they may turn to their criminal friends for social support.  
Turning to those kinds of contacts may lead to re-involvement in offending behavior, 
even though that was not the intention of the offender when seeking out the support 
of others with the same offender status (Wheeler 1961).
Prisonization occurs for all incarcerated offenders. This presents the question, 
how can prisonization be used to explain differences in recidivism rates as a function 
of sentence length? As the research reviewed above suggests, perhaps prisonization 
has more deleterious effects for first time versus repeat offenders.  If the first time 
offender is sentenced to a relatively short prison term then they have experienced the 
punishment and may be deterred from committing future criminal acts because they 
want to avoid future punishment.  However if the first time offender is sentenced to a 
longer prison stay, longer than the optimal length to achieve specific deterrence, then 
s/he will undergo prisonization, develop a criminal self-concept, learn to do crime 
better than before this period of incarceration and be more likely to engage in future 
offending behavior in accordance with the new self concept. Repeat offenders have 
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theoretically undergone the process of prisonization and so if they are incarcerated for 
a second time for a long period of time, there is no theoretical reason to expect that 
the length of their sentence will impact the probability of recidivism since they have 
already been prisonized from their first incarceration. So perhaps for repeat offenders 
there is no relationship between incarceration length and the probability of 
recidivism, which is what has been demonstrated in previous research (Dejong 1997).
Labeling Theory
Another theoretical perspective that deals with altered self concepts and 
predicts an increased probability of recidivism with increased time served is the 
symbolic interactionist perspective.  Students of the labeling might argue that 
punishment – which is the public identification and treatment of an individual as a 
deviant – may also increase secondary deviance or recidivism (Harris 1975; Tittle 
1975).  These theorists posit “that the reaction of social control agents, through the 
application of a ‘deviant’ label, results in actor’s being typified or ‘cast’ as a deviant,” 
(Paternoster & Iovanni 1989, 375).  Official intervention increases the probability of 
creating a commitment to deviance when the actors’ commitment might have been 
low before the intervention.  The casting process results in the actor adopting an 
image of themselves as a deviant person, an image that might not have been present 
until after the intervention.  Once this transformation occurs, the labeled individual
seeks out the company of those who have similar motivational systems that favor law 
violation.  Associating with these similarly situated people leads to fewer legitimate
opportunities and more illegal opportunities (Tittle 1975). Both of these factors may 
24
lead to increased future offending by those who have been officially labeled.  Thus 
there are three consequences of being labeled a delinquent; 1) a change in one’s 
personal identity, 2) segregation from conventional society, and 3) an increase in the 
probability of future law breaking behavior. 
For my purposes, the consequence of labeling, that may provide insights as to
why specific deterrence is ineffective, is that the altered self-concept may lead to 
acting out in deviant ways (Paternoster and Iovanni 1989).  Thus, after violent 
offenders are convicted and have been labeled deviants, they may return home with 
an altered self-image as a criminal individual.  Finding that their opportunities are 
blocked they may take this new master status and become more likely to engage in 
acts which are in line with the image of themselves as a criminal (Paternoster and 
Iovanni 1989, Tittle 1975). 
Not everyone who is labeled deviant will accept that new identity.  Scientists 
have identified several characteristics of the actor that will make a difference in who 
is more susceptible to secondary deviance as a result of labeling: 
“1) the degree of self-orientation, or the tenacity with which one holds 
one’s personal identity …, 2) the degree of affective bonds; or 
emotional ties between actor and both normal and deviant others, and 
3) the similarity between actor’s and other’s categories for describing 
an identity that is attributed to him,” (Paternoster & Iovanni 1989).
For those offenders who serve lengthy prison sentences, all the above characteristics 
will be affected.  In prison, it is difficult to have a personal identity, when everything 
that you do is done together with numerous others – from eating meals, taking 
exercise, showering and going to bed all together.  With extended prison stays, 
inmates lose ties to the outside world and their ties with other inmates increase in 
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number and strength. As these bonds increase, inmates begin to identify with one 
another and can attribute to themselves a criminal persona.
While theoretically, the concept of labeling is appealing, there has been little 
consensus in the empirical literature to unequivocally support such a perspective.  
Most of the research to date has assumed that any sanction or official act of negative 
classification amounts to labeling (Tittle 1975). This has lead to a plethora of labeling 
research done on various interventions such as arrest, conviction for various offenses, 
being placed on probation, imprisonment, and even hospitalization for mental illness 
(Tittle 1975).  One issue that continues to be a point of contention in labeling research 
is whether the characteristics of sanctions themselves are important in determining if 
an offender is deterred from criminal activity or takes part in further rule violation.  
Tittle suggests that sanctions that are imposed by an in-group member or significant 
other are more likely to deter.  Whereas sanctions that are public, certain, severe and 
made by a control agent may be crucial in the production of secondary deviance.
There have been few studies to examine the labeling process specifically in 
the context sentence severity.  One early study indicates that there may be a link 
between increased future offending and sentence length.  Harris (1975) surveyed 234 
black and white inmates in a New Jersey correctional facility.  He found with 
increased imprisonment, both races reported they would be more likely to engage in 
future criminal involvement upon their release.   
Also, researchers have noted that the labeling perspective may also suffer 
from the selection bias problems that plague recidivism studies.  It is reasonable to 
attribute future offending to some unobserved propensity to offend that existed in an 
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offender prior to the casting process began.  In a quasi-experimental study of British 
youth, Farrington (1977) concludes that public labeling as measured by criminal 
convictions increases future criminal behavior, which was measured by self -reported 
delinquency scores.  Later scholarship calls into question Farrington’s early 
conclusions.  Is it possible that differences in later offending between those who are 
formally processed and those who are not simply reflects a preexisting propensity 
towards criminal behavior?  In that case, what researchers have called deviance 
amplification would in fact be the result of a selection artifact.  When employing 
three different statistical techniques to control for selection bias, Smith and 
Paternoster (1990) find that the evidence for a deviance amplification theory is not
compelling.  
Though the empirical evidence is inconclusive and has many shortcomings, it 
is not yet time to close the book on this theoretical perspective. One area of labeling 
that deserves more empirical theorizing and empirical attention is the link between 
labeling and sentence severity.  From previous research (e.g. Harris 1975) we know 
that youthful inmates who are serving long incarceration terms are more likely to 
report a higher relative expected value for committing crimes in the future than 
inmates who are sentenced for shorter periods of time.  They also found this 
relationship to be curvilinear in the expected direction.  Shorter sentences produce a 
labeling effect that decreases somewhat, then reaches a trough and begins to rise 
again dramatically.  The longer sentences produce a significant labeling effect, “an 
apparent strengthening of the motivational basis of ‘secondary deviance,” (Harris 
1975; 82).
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This suggests that labeling effects are dynamic and change depending on the 
severity of the punishment associated with the label of deviance.  Rather than 
conceptualizing labeling as on and off switch, perhaps it would be more informative 
to consider labeling as a continuum.  Offenders may adhere to the label less 
tenaciously when they have spent less time incarcerated with criminal others, and 
continue to have strong ties to significant others on the outside (Orsagh and Chen 
1988).  Offenders who experience longer periods of incarceration may be more 
wedded to the criminal label, less likely to have maintained bonds and support 
structures on the outside and therefore more likely to engage in future criminal 
behavior.  While suggestive, the Harris study was of a youthful sample and examined
perceived probability of future criminal behavior rather than concrete post-release 
behavior and thus cannot be generalized to a sample of violent adult offenders. The 
results are nonetheless suggestive of a possible process where labeling theory can 
account for the increase in recidivism after long periods of incarceration in a 
curvilinear fashion.  
From the preceding summary of the recidivism, sentence length and sentence 
severity and alternative theoretical explanations, it is apparent that prior research has 
several limitations. First, investigators operationalize sentence severity as an 
incarceration sentence versus a probation sentence rather than examining actual 
sentence length.  Second, because of poor record keeping and because offenders were 
sometimes released prior to the completion of their full sentence, it was difficult to 
get accurate data on the exact length of time an offender was incarcerated.   These 
and other types of omitted variable problems severely impact scientists’ ability to 
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accurately model the process of recidivism.  Third, there have not been many good 
quality studies that focus on the recidivism of adult serious violent offenders, one of 
the groups most often targeted for harsh sentences.  Finally, the most important 
limitation is that previous research has failed to take into account the problem of 
selection bias. Those that receive harsher punishments are also those who are more 
likely to recidivate. 
The present study is an attempt to unravel some of these issues.  I take the 
advice of Baumer (1997), Nagin (1998) and Smith and Paternoster (1990) who urge 
researchers to take into account the selection bias in recidivism research and to 
address previous model specification errors.  There continues to be conflicting 
evidence about the relationship between sentence length and recidivism.  I attempt to
fill this gap in the literature by analyzing a group of violent offenders released from 
several jurisdictions in Pennsylvania between 1997 and 2001.  I also propose the use 
of instrumental variable estimation as an analytic technique that attempts  to control 
for the possible omitted variable bias and bias related to selection in previous studies.
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IV. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In considering the research questions that I would like to address, I must first 
acknowledge the limitations of this current research.  The data was provided to me by 
the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD) and was from the 
Bureau of Prisons detailing primarily recidivism information.  Because the data was 
from the Bureau of Prisons and not the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing
(PCS), it contains a substantial amount of information regarding the actual sentence 
imposed, the jurisdiction, and a description of the current offense and most 
importantly the identifier of the sentencing judge.  The data does not contain any 
information on the offender’s criminal history or offense seriousness score.  There are 
also a few of the key offender characteristics that are missing from the data such as 
offender’s age and socio-economic status.  I can address the missing offense 
seriousness scores by using other variables that I do have as proxies.  These will be 
discussed more fully below.  The literature does indicate that one of the major 
determinants of an offender’s sentence is his or her criminal history.  This is a serious 
limitation of the present study, which I am unable to address at the current time.  For 
this reason, this study is simply an exploratory analysis.  I cannot make any causal 
claims because of the limitations of the data, however, if I can show an effect, even a 
small one, by including the judge variables and examine if my predicted sentence 
length has an impact on recidivism with this limited data, then future research would 
be warranted with a more complete data set to determine of the effect continues to 
contribute to recidivism. 
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In the current research I hope to control for omitted variable bias in predicting 
recidivism using judge identifiers as an instrumental variable to predict sentence 
length.  I hope to address the following research questions:  
1) Does the use of individual judge identifiers add to the ability to 
predict sentence length?
2) Is the relationship between sentence severity and recidivism non-
linear?
3) Are offenders who are given longer sentences less likely to 
recidivate, more likely to recidivate or equally likely to recidivate 
than those given shorter sentences for violent offenses?
Before I can use the judge identifier variables in a prediction equation it would be 
beneficial to ascertain what, if anything, the use of these variables adds to the ability 
to explain sentence length.  This point will be further explicated in subsequent 
sections of this manuscript. The second question is the essential research question of 
this study.  How does sentence length impact the recidivism of violent adult 
offenders?
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V. DATA AND VARIABLES
The current research is an attempt to determine whether or not violent 
offenders who have received longer prison sentences are more or less likely to 
recidivate.  I focus on violent offenders because in recent years, many policy 
decisions have been targeted towards them (Spohn 2002).  Sentencing guidelines in 
most states have strived to increase penalties for violent offenders, and eliminate the 
possibility of parole and early release for good behavior.  I analyze a group of violent 
offenders who received a custodial sentence so that I can focus explicitly on sentence 
length as an independent variable in predicting recidivism.   
Data from Pennsylvania is useful for several reasons. First Pennsylvania has a 
unique sentencing framework.  After reforms enacted in 1982, the state adopted 
sentencing guidelines whose main purpose was to reduce sentencing disparity and to 
reduce perceived leniency in the judicial system.  The guidelines were used to
establish a presumptive range of sentences that judges could impose.  The guidelines 
underwent comprehensive revision in 1994, after smaller changes in 1989 and 1991, 
to reflect increased problems with prison overcrowding (Sabol et. al. 2002). There 
were also revisions made in 1997 and more recently in 2005. Because of the 
overcrowding issues, a policy shift occurred and the 1994 guidelines had the specific 
objective to increase the use of prison for violent criminals and reduce the use of 
prison for property offenders and drug offenders (Sabol et. al. 2002).  Judges in 
Pennsylvania can depart from guideline recommendations simply by providing a 
reason for doing so. Judges have a great amount of discretion and leeway in 
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determining appropriate sentences.  These reasons make Pennsylvania an ideal 
location to examine the deterrent effect of sentence length on recidivism.
The data was obtained from the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and 
Delinquency (PCCD) and originally contained information from 206,233 records for 
offenders sentenced from 1940 through January of 2004 in the state of Pennsylvania.  
The unit of analysis is the individual offender.  Working with this data set was
problematic for 2 major reasons.  First, the data was provided in a series of access 
files.  The first type of file was a large table of information on the offense, sentence, 
judge assignment, sentencing dates etc of over 206,233.  There were additional files 
that were broken into 4 separate files for each month of each year from 1996-2001.  
The first file was a list of all offenders who had been released that particular month.  
The second file contained a list of offenders who had been released that month and 
then returned to the Bureau of Prisons custody within 6 months to 1 year after their 
initial release2.  The third file contained a list of offenders who had been released that 
particular month and been returned to custody after 3 years.  The final file contained 
information on offenders released that month who returned to custody after 6 years.  
Unfortunately the 6 year recidivism files were incomplete given that the offenders 
released in 2001 would not have had the full 6 years in which to recidivate. Thus the 
3 year fixed follow-up period was chosen for purposes of this analysis.  In addition to 
the name and identification number of the inmates who were returned to custody, the 
3 and 6 yr returnee files contained demographic information, dates of parole and dates 
2 Bureau of Prisons record keeping changed between 1996 and 1997.  In 1996 the returnee file 
contained offenders who had recidivated after 6 months. After 1997 and until 2001 the first returnee 
file contains offenders who recidivate after 1 year. 
33
returned to bureau of prison custody and the stated reason for return, new arrest / 
conviction or parole violation and basic demographic information.
After choosing the follow up period, I combined the 3 year recidivism files for 
each month with the records of those men who had been released during that month.  
This process was lengthy because it had to be repeated for each month of each year.  
After creating one file containing all the information on inmates released between 
1996 and 2001 and their recidivism I then needed match those records with the table 
that contained all the other relevant sentencing data.  I aggregated over year and 
created one large data file that finally contained demographic information on the 
defendant, the dates sentence started, dates released and paroled and if parole was 
violated, the length of time incarcerated, demographics and the judge identifier.
The Second difficulty with the data was the way the judge identifier was 
coded.  Rather than assigning judges with some unique number or series of numbers 
and letters the data came with the actually judges name as the judge identifier.  This 
was problematic because there was no standard way to enter the judge’s name.  Judge 
John Smith could have been entered as:
- John  A. Smith




- Smith, A. John
Because the task of matching the judge names was going to have to be done by hand, 
I wanted to reduce the sample size to make this task as easy as possible.  
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First I limited the areas of Pennsylvania that I would examine and choose to 
include only cases from the 33 Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs or 
MSAs) in Pennsylvania as defined by the Census (N= 178,912)3. Also Pennsylvania 
instituted sentencing guidelines in 1982.  I choose to analyze cases that were 
sentenced after 1985, which was 2 years after the guidelines went into effect.  This 2 
year buffer was chosen to ensure that the kinks had been worked out and that full 
implementation of the guidelines was taking place across the state. Also when 
examining the data it became apparent that the data from 1996 was different from the 
rest of the data in that it did not contain the demographic variables that the remaining 
years of data included.  For this reason, inmates released in 1996 were excluded from 
the analysis.  With the exclusion of 1996 data the remaining sample is composed of 
individuals sentenced after 1985 and released sometime between 1997 and 2001 (N= 
31,966).  
The remaining 31,966 cases had several thousand unique judge identifiers. I 
needed help to clean this data further and since this was beyond my expertise, I 
contacted Dr. Cynthia Lum who has had experience with this kind of data problem 
from the mapping research she does on hotspots.  Using FoxPro and dropping
punctuation, she helped me to cut down the list of over 5,000 variations in judge 
identifiers to just over 1,500.  Then, by hand I examined the list and grouped those 
names that were most likely the same together using pretty conservative decision 
3 The general concept of a metropolitan statistical area is that of a core area containing a substantial 
population nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a high degree of social and economic 
integration with that core.  MSAs can comprise one or more entire counties. In Pennsylvania, all the 
MSAs are individual counties.
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rules4. After several iterations, it was determined that there were 308 unique judges.
Dr. Lum was able to take the 308 judge names that had been identified and match 
them directly to all the different variations of judge names in the data.
The original data set included data from persons convicted of a variety of 
offenses including, fraud, drug possession, and forgery. Since the focus of this study 
is violent offenders, all cases not involving a violent offense were excluded from the 
analysis (excluded cases 18,431) (N = 13,535) 5. Of the remaining cases 171 were 
escapees, 473 died either of natural causes, suicide or homicide, 626 (313 individuals) 
were duplicate files for offenders serving multiple sentences.  The duplicate files, 
escapees, and dead individuals were all excluded from the present analysis 
(N=12,265).
Also to ensure that statistical analysis would be meaningful and have 
sufficient variation, the decision was made to analyze only the cases from judges who 
sentenced at least 20 offenders in the remaining sample (excluded cases N=3,449).  
One hundred thirty nine cases had missing information on the judge identifier 
variable and were also excluded. Also, one case containing an extremely large 
minimum sentence (70 years) was excluded because it is an extreme outlier 
(remaining N=8,676). The largest minimum sentence for the remaining data was 35 
4 The rules were as follows:
1) All names that were clearly the same, first and last names identical but in different 
orders or including obvious spelling errors were grouped together. 
2) All unique and distinctive last names that were the same were grouped together 
and counted as one judge if the first initial matched what was known about the 
judge compared to the results of the first grouping using rule #1.  
3) For more common last names such as Smith and Brown, if only the first initial was 
present and there were multiple variations such as a Charles Smith and a Calvin 
Smith and several entries of a C. Smith, then judge name was left as C. Smith and 
all C. Smiths were grouped together only if they were from the same county.  
5 Violent offenses include: Murder, Manslaughter, Involuntary Manslaughter, Aggravated Assault, 
Indecent Assault, Rape, Robbery and Burglary.
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years.  As a result of this constraint on the judge assignment variable, several counties 
were excluded either because the county itself had less than 20 cases remaining in the 
sample or because all the cases in that particular county were sentenced by the same 
judge (excluded cases N = 429).  These counties were also excluded from the present 
analysis6.  In addition, there were 52 cases of individuals who had a negative value 
for the time served variable.  These individuals had a sentence start date after the 
recorded sentence start date.  There was no consistent and systematic reasoning for 
this finding and because it is impossible to determine exactly how much time these 
inmates spent in prison these cases were also excluded (Final sample size = 8,195). 
The final analysis includes data from 18 counties, See Table 2 for a complete list of 
counties included in the analysis.
Variables in the Analysis
Control Variables
Many variables have been identified as having an impact on sentence length.  
This analysis will attempt to control for those variables within the limitations of the 
data.  
Characteristics of the offense: The data set includes statutory offense codes as 
well as a verbal description of what that code entails.  Thus robberies that result in 
serious bodily injury are different from robberies with no injuries. (See Table 1 for a 
list of the offenses included and their descriptions.) These offense descriptions are 
included in the analysis as a series of dummy variables.  As mentioned above, the 
6 The following counties were excluded: Blair, Butler, Cambria, Carbon, Columbia, Cumberland, 
Lackawanna, Lebanon, Luzerne, Mercer, Northampton, Perry, Pike, Somerset, Wyoming)
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data do not include offense seriousness scores from the Pennsylvania guidelines.  
Fortunately, in addition to the actual number of months each offender served (Year
Served variable), I also have the minimum sentence that each offender could have 
been sentenced to which I will use as a proxy for seriousness.  This is admittedly not 
the best measure of offense seriousness, but statutory minimum sentence is a crude 
indicator of the seriousness of the offense. This minimum sentence is measured in 
years.
Previous research has shown that the area a person lives in may have an 
impact on recidivism, in addition to limiting my analysis to PMSA counties; I also 
include the county as a control variable.  These are included as a series of dummy 
variables for each of the 28 counties remaining in the sample.  
The PCCD data includes identifying information on the specific judge who 
sentenced the offender and I include judge identifier as an independent variable in 
predicting the time served.  The data contained the judge’s name or some variation 
thereof.  After the matching process, each judge name was replaced by a generic 
number and a series of dummy variables was created.  Of the 308 judges identified, 
157 remained after cutting judges who sentenced less than 20 cases and those judges 
in counties where they sentenced all of the cases. 
As mentioned above the Pennsylvania sentencing guidelines underwent a 
substantial revision in 1991, 1994, and 1997. Some of these revisions reflected a 
significant policy shift with regards to sentencing violent offenders.  To take into 
account the differences in sentence length that may be a result of these revisions in 
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the guidelines, I include dummy variable s indicating whether or not the case was 
sentenced under the 1991, 1994 or 1997 guidelines. 
Characteristics of the Offender: The above cited recidivism literature shows 
that certain characteristics of offenders are related to future recidivism, so to the 
extent that I am able, I want to control for these variables.  The PCCD data includes 
information on the gender, race (defined as Black, White, Hispanic, Asian, Native 
American or Other), and marital status (Married, Single, Widowed, Divorced or 
Unknown).
This data is limited in that there was no information on offender’s age, 
education, substance abuse, SES, employment, or family background.  There was also 
no indication of the mode of conviction or other important courtroom process 
variables such as caseload.  These are variables that have been shown in previous 
research to have an impact on sentence length. Because this data set does not have 
these variables, they could not be controlled for.  Despite the fact that these variables 
are missing, they’re impact will nevertheless affect the results of this study. 
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is recidivism.   Research in the past has used various 
methods of defining failure in recidivism studies.  The most common methods are
rearrest or reconviction.  Some researchers have been even more conservative and 
recorded failure as any new conviction in the follow up period.  All three methods 
have advantages and disadvantages as discussed above.  Using arrest as a measure of 
failure is a more liberal measure, but it may be inaccurate because offenders may be 
labeled as such by police and as Tittle (1975) points out, ex-convicts are more likely 
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to re-arrested independent of their actual criminal behavior. Using parole violations as 
an estimate may also be inaccurate because some offenders slip through the cracks, 
their violations never discovered or reported.  Thus far there is no perfect method for 
measuring failure.  The PCCD data includes the actual date on which the offender 
was returned to prison, whether it was for a parole violation, or a new conviction.  
Thus my measure of recidivism is re-commitment to the bureau of prisons custody
and I will use dummy variables to control for a parole violation or a new conviction.  
The use of re-commitment to the bureau of prisons custody has advantages 
and disadvantages.  Specifically if an offender was on parole at the time of a new 
arrest for another offense, they may be re-admitted to prison for the parole violation 
without the costly process of going through a trial again.  Also offenders may be re -
admitted to prison on a parole violation that is not a criminal offense (Tittle 1975).  
For instance, one of the conditions for parole may be that an offender stay away from 
alcohol that s/he is an alcoholic or if s/he must stay away from school playgrounds if 
s/he is a sex offender.  An offender may also have parole revoked for failing to report 
to a parole officer or for leaving the jurisdiction without prior permission from the 
parole officer.  A violation of this nature is not necessarily a criminal offense, yet it 
may land a person back in prison if caught by a parole officer. The merit of this 
measure of recidivism is that it is like using a fishing net, it will detect those “big 
fish” who are more likely to be truly re-involved in crime as well as some of those 
“small fish” who are re-involved in some form of delinquent behavior.  Also, because 
I include those that have been re-admitted to bureau of prisons custody because of a 
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parole violation, I will also include offenders who were not formally processed for a 
new crime and simply returned to prison to serve out the remainder of their sentence. 
The data set does include information on the reason for re-commitment, 
whether it was for a parole violation or for a new conviction.  However because of the 
methods used to arrive at the present sample, there were only 27 individuals who 
were re-admitted to custody for a new conviction.  Due to the small number of re-
commitments for a new conviction, they are combined with individuals who were re-
committed to for a parole violation for the purposes of this analysis. 
Proposed Analytic Method
I propose to follow the technique articulated by Angrist and Krueger (2001) as 
well as Smith and Paternoster (1990) and conduct instrumental variables estimation
(IVE).  This is an appropriate method for this data for several reasons.  First, IVE is 
used for exploring the relationship between an outcome variable and a predictor 
variable in cases where the predictor variable is endogenous.  Endogeneity in the 
predictor variable occurs when the predictor variable is correlated with the residuals 
in the regression model that describes its relationship with the outcome of interest.  In 
the present study, length of sentence is the predictor variable and recidivism is the 
outcome.  There are many factors that go into the determination of length of sentence.  
Some of these factors I attempt to control for and the others appear in the error term.  
Second, in focusing on recidivism I know that there are many factors that play 
a role in whether or not an individual will recidivate.  I want to know specifically 
what kind of an impact does the actual length of sentence have on recidivism.  
Unfortunately, some of the factors that go into predicting time served may also be 
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correlated with the error term in the equation.  There is no guarantee that the
independent variable (time served) and the error term of the equation will be 
uncorrelated and therefore no guarantee that an ordinary least squares estimate of 
predicted sentence length will be an unbiased and consistent estimator of sentence 
length. Also, there is no guarantee that I have included all the relevant variables that 
predict recidivism.  Social scientists have developed instrumental variable estimation 
as a technique that can solve the problem of omitted variable bias.  
IVE uses an additional variable, the instrument, to separate any exogenous 
variation in the endogenous predictor variable.  There are 3 assumptions that 
guarantee the success of the IVE technique: 1) the instrument must predict the 
predictor variable; 2) the instrument must be uncorrelated with the residuals in the 
second stage model; and 3) the instrument must act on the outcome only through the 
question predictor and not directly by itself, See Figure 1 (Pindyck and Rubineld
1998).  
The IVE method involves finding a new variable, Z, which is correlated with 
the X and at the same time uncorrelated with the error term in the equation, U.  
X Y
Z U
Figure 1. Sample Instrumental Variable Equation
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Following the recommendations of Angrist and Krueger (2001) as well as Smith and 
Paternoster (1990), when utilizing the instrumental variable approach, the optimal 
method is to calculate the predicted length of sentence for this group of offenders.  
Then regress the predicted sentence length and all other control variables on the 
predicted recidivism rate.  When predicting sentence lengths, I need to include as an 
instrument a variable that is not associated with the residuals in the regression 
equation, but is associated with sentence length.   I was fortunate enough to find a 
data set that includes such an instrumental variable.  Data from the Pennsylvania 
Bureau of Prisons included recidivism data as well as judge identifiers that can be
used as an instrument. As will be demonstrated below, judge assignment has some 
impact on the determination of sentence length.  At this time, there is no evidence that 
this assignment has any impact directly on recidivism or would be related to the error 
term in a regression equation.  
This method is usually done using the two-stage least squares approach.  In 




Figure 2. Present Studies IVE Equation
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and the predicted sentence length is calculated for each individual in the dataset.  I 
will calculate the predicted sentence length according to the equation below:
Equation 1. predicted sentence length = β0 + β1  counties + β2  marital 
status + β3 race + β4 offense + β5  min sentence + β6  judge + 
β7 1991 guidelines + β8 1994 guidelines + β9 1997 guidelines 
+ β8 gender
If the instrument is truly exogenous, then the predicted sentence length will only 
contain part of the variation in the original sentence length variable that can be 
attributed to judge assignment. This predicted sentence length can be used in place of 
the true sentence length in the second stage model to examine the relationship 
between recidivism and time served. Thus, with the predicted sentence length 
obtained from Equation 1, I can then attempt to predict the probability of recidivism 
using Equation 2:
Equation 2. recidivism = β0 + β1 predicted sentence length + β2  Counties + 
β3  marital status + β4  Race + β5  offense + β6  min sentence + 
β7 predicted sentence length2 + β8 1991 guidelines + β9 1994
guidelines + β10 1997 guidelines + β11 gender
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VI. INSTRUMENTS IN PREDICTING SENTENCE 
LENGTH
What are the factors that make judge assignment a good instrument for 
predicting recidivism?  Of significance for this research is that judges in Pennsylvania 
have an extraordinary ability to determine sentences even after the imposition of the 
guidelines, especially for violent offenders. As I shall illustrate below, despite the use 
of sentencing guidelines in Pennsylvania, individual judges matter in determining 
sentences.  However, the assignment to a specific judge has no direct relation to the 
probability of recidivism that this researcher could uncover, making this one of the 
better variables to use as an instrument.  
Why does assignment to a judge matter in the sentence length decision? There 
is some research to suggest that judge assignment does not matter. This body of 
research on judge effects generally examines the traits of court actors (Frazier & 
Bock 1982; Myers 1988; Spohn 1990; Steffensmeier & Hebert 1999).  The bulk of 
this research finds no direct effect of judge social background characteristics on 
sentencing patterns (Frazier & Block 1982, Myers 1988).  More recent research 
indicates that female judges may sentence repeat black offenders more harshly 
(Steffensmeier & Hebert 1999) and that Black judges sentence black defendants more 
harshly than white defendants in some instances (Spohn 1990; Steffensmeier & Britt 
2001).  The empirical evidence for judge effects in sentencing does not appear 
convincing at first glance.  However most of the early research in this area examined 
judge characteristics independently and did not account for possible interactions 
between judge characteristics and courtroom contexts. There remain convincing 
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theoretical reasons to expect judicial background characteristics to matter in judges 
sentencing decisions. 
In perhaps one of the most thorough studies of the process of sentencing, 
Hogarth (1971) examines the complexity of the sentencing process when the legal 
and factual make up of the case, the social constraints imposed by membership in the 
courtroom workgroup, and psychological and sociological factors are given 
theoretical consideration. Hogarth compares a phenomenological model of sentencing 
to a input-output model. He finds that over 50% of the variation in sentencing can be 
accounted for by knowing certain pieces of information about the judge himself and 
incorporating that into the analyses. Some of these pieces of information are the usual 
suspects in judge effects modeling: jurisdiction of magistrates; background 
characteristics such as community of residence, class, age, religious affiliation, length 
of judicial experience etc; penal philosophies; attitudes concerning crime, sentencing 
and justice; magistrate caseload; and degree of legal training. 
Hogarth takes the modeling of judge effects one step farther through in-depth
interviews with over 70 judges and observational study of courtroom processes.  He 
finds that there are other factors that influence the process of sentencing, for example 
the process through which magistrates collect, communicate and assess information 
regarding the offense and the defendant, or the complexity of the magistrates’ thought 
process in sentencing.  Hogarth (1971) concludes that sentencing is a dynamic 
process in which the facts of the cases, the constraints arising out of the law and the 
social system, and other features of the external world are interpreted, assimilated, 
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and made sense of in ways compatible with the attitudes of the magistrates in the 
study.
 In Pennsylvania, the sentencing structure is described as loose precisely 
because it is less restrictive on judicial discretion and provides greater latitude for 
judges to consider legal and extralegal factors (Steffensmeier & Demuth 2001). In 
fact, Pennsylvania’s guidelines establish standard, aggravated and mitigated ranges 
from which judges choose a minimum sentence. They are allowed to depart from the 
guideline ranges simply by stating their reasons for doing so.  Thus, judges in 
Pennsylvania have more discretion than similarly situated judges in other states.
Pennsylvania’s guidelines mandate that severity of the convicted offense and 
the prior record are to be the major determinants of sentences.  There is a growing 
body of literature that says that judges themselves have an effect in determining how 
long of a sentence an offender will receive above and beyond factors pertaining to 
seriousness of the offense and offenders criminal history (Johnson 2003; Hogarth 
1971; and Bushway & Piehl 2001).  Former Justice Marshall remarked that:
“[E]xcessive discretion fosters inequality in the distribution of 
entitlements and harms, inequality which is especially troublesome 
when these benefits and burdens are great; and discretions can mask 
the use by officials of illegitimate criteria in allocating important 
goods and rights. (Tonry 1987, 371) 
Judges are important members of the courtroom workgroup.  They make bail 
decisions and sentencing decisions that have long term impacts on the lives of 
defendants.  Their decisions are rarely only based on proved offenses, but also on 
their ideas about possible future offenses of the individual involved.  Because judges 
are forced to make decisions with incomplete knowledge, they must rely on their own 
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past experience, stereotypes, and prejudices and thus they develop a set of “patterned 
responses” that help them reduce uncertainty in the sentencing process (Albonetti 
1991).
In her recent book, Spohn (2002) discusses the fact that when making 
sentencing decisions, judges rely on both legally relevant factors (offender criminal 
record and offense seriousness) as well as legally irrelevant factors.  More and more 
research has demonstrated that judges are taking into account legally irrelevant 
factors in their decision making such as race of defendant, age of the defendant, 
gender of the defendant, social class of the defendant, and whether the defendant was 
represented by a public defender or private attorney (Ulmer & Kramer 1996; Spohn 
2002; and Steffensmeier & Demuth 2001).  
These findings must also be interpreted with caution because, as the literature 
has shown, legally irrelevant factors are correlated with legally relevant factors, for 
instance young African American males are more likely to have a longer criminal 
record and so the race effect in a sentence may be operating through this interaction 
(Bushway & Piehl 2001).  Another reason for caution in interpreting these results is 
that there are many hurdles in the prosecution of an offender before s/he even reaches 
the sentencing stage, so observed disparities may reflect disparity in other stages of 
the system that are not solely attributable to the actor who actually imposes sentences 
(Spohn 2002; and Bushway and Piehl 2001).  
To address some of these cautions and find out exactly what part of the 
variation in sentencing is due to judicial discretion, Bushway and Piehl (2001), using 
a sample of offenders sentenced in Maryland, test the hypothesis that sentencing 
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departures are being used to disproportionately sentence African Americans to longer 
sentences. By modeling the Maryland sentencing grid and controlling for age, gender, 
guidelines recommended sentence, and the manner of conviction (trial or guilty plea), 
they find that the variation associated with the difference between judges’ sentencing 
decisions of African Americans and whites is about 20 percent.  Bushway and Piehl 
interpret their findings to suggest that judges in states with less restrictive guidelines 
(similar to the ones used in Pennsylvania) are using legal factors above and beyond 
their prescribed purpose, thus using an extensive criminal history to determine the 
minimum sentence and also departing to a higher sentence based on the same 
criminal history.  
Recent research on sentencing guidelines has shown that sentence departures 
from the guidelines are another source of extralegal disparity.  Johnson (2003) 
provides insight into the role of different courtroom actors in the sentencing process 
by investigating whether the effect of race and other extralegal factors on upward and 
downward departures are moderated by mode of conviction.  According to Johnson, 
departures allow judges to reintroduce their personal judgment into the sentencing 
process.  Using PCS data from 1996-1998, Johnson breaks down mode of conviction 
into four categories; negotiated pleas, non-negotiated pleas, bench trials and jury 
trials.  Controlling for offense seriousness, criminal history, county courtroom factors, 
race, age, gender, and mode of conviction, he evaluates the likelihood that an 
offender will receive a sentence above or below the standard guideline range. 
Johnson finds that judges consider multiple factors in sentencing.  “Offenders 
who exercise their right to trial … Offenders who have racial/ethnic attributes that are 
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tied to offender-based focal concerns, such as perceived dangerousness, increased 
culpability, or a lack of rehabilitative potential, are [at] a disadvantage,” (Johnson 
2003, 469). His research demonstrates that there are important differences in the 
effects of legal and extralegal factors across modes of conviction and more 
importantly for the present research, he demonstrates that the increased use of 
patterned responses by judges influence judges’ assessments of blameworthiness and 
future dangerousness which leads to different likelihood of departure for certain 
categories of offenders. 
The current study does not have the appropriate data to replicate these 
findings; but I think they clearly demonstrate that individual judges do have an 
impact on the variation in sentence length that is measurable.  Assignment to judge 
can have an impact on the length of sentence one receives.  Each county in 
Pennsylvania determines their own process for case assignment, but generally the 
president judge7 of the district will assign one judge to determine the caseload for that 
district.  
In larger jurisdictions of Pennsylvania, judges may specialize in certain types 
of cases.  I have no direct data to control for this type of specialization, still judge 
specialization would provide a more conservative test of specific deterrence.  If judge 
assignment is not truly random and some judges get assigned more difficult cases 
consistently for sentencing and they sentence them more severely, than judge 
assignment may be correlated with the error term in the regression equation which 
may also impact recidivism.  Economists have named this kind of variable a quasi-
7 There are 386 judges in 60 districts for 67 counties in the state of Pennsylvania.  Each district has a 
President Judge, usually the person with the most years on the bench.  The President Judge is the head 
administrator for the district.  
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instrument because it may not be truly exogenous (Goodliffe working paper). In 
Monte Carlo experiments, quasi-instruments, while still somewhat biased continue to 
perform better than regular OLS. Angrist (1991) demonstrates that with large 
samples, violations of the assumption of no correlation between the instrument and 
the unobserved correlates of the outcome of interest do not perform worse than the 
correctly specified estimator.  In fact, just identified models only slightly 
underestimate the true treatment effect (Angrist 1991). On the other hand, OLS can 
extremely over estimate the relationship, sometimes up to four times as much 
(Angrist 1991).  Thus, if judge assignment is correlated to unmeasured covariates in 
the equation, then I know that the treatment effect really underestimates the true 
effect of sentence length on recidivism, giving a conservative test of my hypothesis.  
51
VII. Findings
Tables 38 and 49 present descriptive statistics for the variables in this analysis. 
Because of the data reduction methods utilized in this analysis, none of the results are 
generalizable to the population at large.  I can only speak for this group of offenders
from these counties in Pennsylvania.  In general, these offenders served up to 17 
years in prison. The average sentence length was 5.92 years.   The majority of the 
cases come from Philadelphia (53%).  This sample of ex-inmates is overwhelmingly 
male (91%) and over half are African American (61%).  Most are single (69%).  Over 
30% were sentenced under the 1994 sentencing guidelines.  The most frequently 
occurring offenses that resulted in their incarceration are aggravated assault, burglary 
and robbery. Thus the median offender in the sample would be a single African 
American male, who was arrested in Philadelphia for a robbery of some kind not 
involving serious bodily injury.  Number of cases, average time sentenced, average 
minimum sentence and recidivism rates are broken down and reported by judge in 
Table 4.  Average sentence ranges from a low of 2.19 years to a high of 12.56 years. 
About 19% of the sample was returned to prison within the three year follow-
up period.  This is substantially lower than previous studies have reported (Wesiburd 
et al. 1995; Spohn & Holleran 2002 and Dejong 1997).  These other studies have 
examined different types of offenders, drug offenders and white collar offenders 
8 The models presented are linear probability models used because the estimation of instrumental 
variables does not operate yet in a Logit or Probit model.
9 The minimum sentence variable has a minimum value of 0 for two reasons 1) because time was 
measured in years there is some rounding error involved. 2) There were 16 offenders who were given a 
life sentence and subsequently had their sentences vacated and reduced.  They were included in this 
analysis because they met all the other sample requirements.  Because their initial offense was 
recorded as a life sentence, their minimum sentence in the data was recorded as a 0.   
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whereas this research focuses on the recidivism of violent offenders.  Violent offenses 
are often crimes of passion that are done in the heat of the moment and are causes 
largely by circumstances.  Other types of offenders, such as property offenders are 
more opportunistic in their offending and more likely to re-offend than violent 
offenders (Baumer 1997). Also one can argue that drug offenders are physiologically 
predisposed to re-offending until they are able to kick their drug habit. 
Table 5 presents the results of regressions predicting the probability of 
recidivism.  In Model 1, I estimate a simple OLS Regression using sentence length as 
the target independent variable and controlling for, metropolitan statistical area,
offense, marital status, race, gender, minimum sentence and sentencing under 1991, 
1994, or 1997 guidelines.  The estimates of only the key variables are presented in 
Table 5.  According to Model 1, the OLS regression model, a one year increase in 
actual sentence length increases the probability of recidivism by .046.  Figure 3 
represents the predicted probability of recidivism under the OLS framework.  The 
graph demonstrates that as additional years are added to a sentence, the predicted 
probability of recidivism increases dramatically.  At a sentence length of 17 years, the 
predicted probability of recidivism is .84.
The OLS (Model 1) also indicates that the minimum sentence and guidelines 
variables are all significantly related to the probability of recidivism.  For each 
additional year increase in the minimum sentence, the probability of recidivism 
decreases by -0.017.  This is a counterintuitive finding as this analysis uses 
minimum sentence as a proxy for offense serious.  Upon further investigation it was 
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found that that minimum sentence is correlated with time served. If minimum
sentence affects recidivism thru time served than this finding would make sense. 
The guidelines variables appear to have the biggest impact on recidivism.  
Whether an inmate was sentenced under the 1991 guidelines was associated with a 
.17 percentage point increase in the probability of recidivism.  The 1994 guidelines 
were associated with a .19 percentage point increase and the 1997 guidelines were 
associated with a .216 percentage point increase in the probability of recidivism. This 
finding may be more a reflection of an age effect than the actual guidelines 
themselves.  Offenders sentenced under the 1997 guidelines are likely to be younger 
than the offenders sentenced under the 1994 guidelines just as offenders sentenced 
under 1994 are likely to be younger than those sentenced under the 1991 guidelines. 
And we know that previous research has demonstrated that the young are more likely 
to recidivate and so it follows that offenders sentenced under the 1997 guidelines 
would have the highest recidivism rates. 
Offenders who were separated, divorced and single were all more likely to 
recidivate than the married offenders, though the widowed were less likely to 
recidivate than married offenders.  As far as race, Asian offenders were less likely to 
recidivate than White Offenders.  Native American, Hispanic and Black offenders 
were more likely to recidivate than White offenders. The Black offenders however 
had a highest probability of recidivism.  None of the marital status or race variables 
were significant.  Also males are more likely to recidivate than females, but this 
finding is also non-significant.
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Overall, these findings are consistent with the previous research that suggests 
that those who were given longer prison sentences have an increased probability of 
re-offending compared to those who were given less severe sentences. However, as 
some social scientists have suggested, perhaps the relationship between sentence 
severity and recidivism is not linear.  I test for this in the next model.  Model 2 
incorporates a squared function of time served to account for non-linearity in the 
relationship between time served and recidivism using OLS regression.  Including the 
squared term increases the probability of recidivism from about .045 to .079. The
coefficient for time served squared is highly significant (p=.000).  This indicates that
since the coefficient of the squared term is significantly different from 0, there is a 
definite indication that the relationship between sentence length and recidivism is 
indeed non-linear. Also note that the relationship is negative. This non-linear finding 
is in line with theoretical predictions. It lends some support to the notion that the 
effect of sentence length on recidivism may vary for different types of offenders.  
The regression equations for the OLS regressions from Model 1 and Model 2 
are represented graphically in Figure 3.  The lines were estimated using the median 
values for each variable.  The regression line represents single black male offenders 
from Philadelphia County, who was sentenced for robbery under the 1994 guidelines.  
As can be observed from the graph, both models approximate the data very similarly. 
Both regression lines (the regular OLS Model 1 and Squared OLS Model 2) have 
similar slopes.  The model with the squared term while in general shows a steady 
increase in the probability of recidivism, seems to begin to level off at 13 years of 
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time served, indicating that the probability of recidivism may have a threshold at a 
sentence length of 13 years for violent offenses.
The same variables that were significant in the OLS model (1) without the 
squared parameter continue to be significant in the OLS model with the squared term;
sentence length, minimum sentence, 1991, 1994,1997 guidelines and Asian offenders.  
They are remarkably similar in magnitude as well.  The only difference is that the 
parameter estimate for whether an offender was sentenced under 1994 guidelines 
decreases by about half the percentage points when the squared term is added. The 
marital status, race and gender effects are essentially the same in Model 2 as they 
were in Model 1.
If a researcher were to examine these two models solely, s/he might be lead to 
make the conclusion that longer sentence lengths indeed increase the probability of 
recidivism.  However, the OLS regressions are limited because by themselves, they 
fail to control for omitted variable bias.  The possibility of omitted variable bias in an 
OLS framework leads to a biased estimator of the true slope parameter.  Since this 
bias will not decrease as the sample size gets larger, omitting a variable from the 
regression equation also leads to an inconsistent estimator.  
To control for bias and present a better specified model, I use instrumental 
variable estimation.  This is a two-stage process.  In the first stage, sentence length is 
predicted using the judge assignment, metropolitan statistical area, offense, marital 
status, race, gender, minimum sentence and whether or not an offender was sentenced 
under the 1991, 1994 or 1997 guidelines.  These first stage results are presented in 
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Table 6.  While this present study undoubtedly is missing some key variables, the 
above listed variables explain about 75% of the variance in sentence length.  
Table 6 presents some findings that require explanation. First some of the 
judge identifier variables were dropped in this analysis and this is presumed to be a 
result of the co-dependency between the explanatory variables in the model.  Judges 
are nested within counties and thus the judge assignment variables are highly 
correlated with county.  Other possible explanations were for the dropped variables 
were investigated such as constancy in certain values of variables.  Alternative 
explanations were systematically examined and ruled out, thus the drops were 
determined to be a result of multi-collinearity.  Also, when the coefficients for the 
offense variables are examined, some of them appear to predict a longer sentence than 
the reference category, which is Murder.  Recall that the sample was limited to those 
offenders who were sentenced after 1885 and released sometime between 1997 and 
2001 and that we have minimum sentence in the model.  When the offenders who 
committed murder in this sample are examined, they served less time relative to their 
minimum sentences than other offenders who committed offenses like forcible rape 
and sexual assault.  Thus the coefficients for those variables are positive.  
The indication that judge assignment is a good instrument comes from the first 
stage F statistic.  Normally a low F-statistic, under 10 (Staiger 2002), or a non 
significant one would be an indication that the instrument is weak.  In the first stage 
of the IVE the F statistic is F = 105.580, which is significant, p=.000.  Based on the F 
statistic, I can conclude that judge assignment is indeed a good instrument.  It is
correlated with sentence length, which is the key independent variable. 
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Using the predicted sentence length from the first stage of the IV regression, I 
then estimate the probability of recidivism controlling for MSAS, offense type, 
marital status, race, gender, minimum sentence and sentenced under 1991, 1994, and 
1997 guidelines.  The instrumental variable regression results are presented under 
Model 3 in Table 7.   Upon examination of this model, it is evident that some 
estimates changed.  Comparing Model 3 with Model 1, it is clear that the probability 
of recidivism using predicted year served on recidivism dropped from .046 to .025.  
Though the beta coefficient dropped, it remains significant.  In fact most of the 
variables that were significant in models 1 and 2 remain significant, i.e. 1991, 1994, 
1997 guidelines, and Asians.  
Two differences in the results are worth examining.  First the effect of 
minimum sentence on the probability of recidivism becomes non-significant.  It 
remains in the negative direction, but is of smaller magnitude when compared to the 
OLS models.  This is likely an indication that minimum sentence affects recidivism 
through time served.  By utilizing the predicted time served variable in the IVE 
estimation, that relationship was accounted for.  Second, with the use of the 
instrumental variable, males have a significantly higher probability of recidivism than 
the females.  This finding is in line with prior research.  
Figure 4 graphically represents the predicted probabilities of recidivism from 
the results of the IVE regressions.  Model 3 is the first IVE regression model run 
without the squared term and Model 4 includes the squared term. Similar to the OLS 
models discussed above, with increases in sentence length the probability of 
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recidivism increases.  Second, the increase in probability of recidivism is of a 
substantially lower magnitude than the OLS models.  
Model 4 is an IVE model run with the squared term to take into account the 
non-linearity in the relationship between time served and recidivism.  The results of 
this model differ slightly from the results from Model 3.  According to Model 4, a one 
year increase in time served increases the probability of recidivism by only .042 
percentage points.  This finding is significant, p<.05.  The sentence length squared 
variable is non-significant in this model, even though its addition increased the 
magnitude of the predicted time served variable. . In the other squared model, Model 
2, where the squared term was estimated in a regular OLS regression, the estimate for 
year served was an 8 percentage point increase in the probability of recidivism.  The 
instrumental variable estimation method cuts down that estimate by almost 50%.  
Interestingly, comparing the two models that use the IVE method, both 
models show that time served has a significant impact on the probability of 
recidivism.  However, when the squared term (Model 4) is included in the equation, it 
is not significant. This is a both an intriguing and confusing finding.  Since use of the 
IVE method is an attempt to control for omitted variable bias, it may be that in Model 
4, the instrumental variable of judge assignment was able to pick up on the omitted 
factor that caused the relationship between sentence length and recidivism to be non-
linear.  
A comparison of both squared models is graphically represented in Figure 5.  
This figure demonstrates that the OLS regression of the probability of recidivism on 
sentence length overestimates the relationship.  The IVE regression demonstrates that 
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the magnitude of the relationship is much smaller. Regarding the third research 
question, whether or not offenders given longer sentences are more likely to 
recidivate, the data demonstrate that those offenders in this sample who are given 
longer sentences are significantly more likely to recidivate than those offenders given 
shorter sentences.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
I must present one caveat before I begin interpreting findings, there are 
significant limitations to this study and the results must be interpreted with caution. 
This data does not include offender’s criminal history nor does it include offense 
seriousness scores or several other important variables that have been demonstrated to 
predict recidivism.  I have tried to account for these missing variables by 
incorporating proxies for offense seriousness such as minimum sentence and offense 
code.  The minimum sentence variable will account somewhat for offense seriousness
but it is not a complete approximation.  That being said, these results are suggestive. 
The contributions of the present study can be divided into methodological 
contributions and substantive contributions.  Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
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Methodological Contribution
The issue of omitted variable bias is one that plagues much of social science 
research.  Instrumental variable estimation is a way to control for the presence of 
omitted variables; yet it is not a method that is used often because of the difficulty in 
finding a good instrument.  The attractiveness of IVE is that it can be used to exploit 
quasi-experimental variation in research.  The IVE method, which has been long used 
by economists, can address omitted variables problems in observational studies and 
address the statistical issues that result from imperfect criminological experiments 
(Angrist 2005).  As a discipline, criminology has not been able to capitalize on this 
method.  The discipline has only a handful of instrumental variables such as Levitt’s 
(1997) work using electoral cycles as an instrumental variable to identify the causal 
effect of police hiring on crime rates or the work of Kling (1999) who uses 
assignment to federal judges to estimate the impact of length of incarceration on 
future employment and earnings. 
Finding a good instrumental variable in criminology is difficult.  The 
instrument should be correlated with the treatment and not correlated with the error 
term. With my limited data set, I found that judge assignment as well as the other 
control variables present in the data explained 75% of the variation in sentence 
length. The use of this instrument demonstrated that without controlling for omitted 
variable bias, a multiple regression approach to predicting recidivism may 
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overestimate the probability by approximately 50% points. The development of judge 
assignment as an instrumental variable and the introduction of this technique to 
criminological questions is a significant contribution to the research of criminologists.
Substantive Contributions
In addition to the methodological contributions there are also substantive 
contributions that can be drawn from this research.  The results of this study provide 
no support for specific deterrence theory as it has been operationalized in this study. 
In every regression estimated, increased severity as measured by increases in sentence 
length was significantly associated with an increase in the predicted probability of 
recidivism for this sample of violent offenders.  This finding adds to the substantial 
body of research that suggests that increases in sentence severity also increases 
probabilities of recidivism (Dejong 1997; Spohn & Holleran 2002; Harris 1975; 
Wooldredge 1988; Visher 1991).
Some have suggested that these empirical findings against deterrence theory
may be a result of an over-extension of the original intent of the theory.  As has been 
discussed above, the original conception of deterrence theory was that if a sanction 
for a crime is certain enough, severe enough and swift enough, then those who 
contemplate engaging in said infraction would re-think that choice because the 
perceived cost of committing the crime would outweigh the potential benefits of 
committing the crime.  This conceptualization of deterrence theory posits nothing 
about whether offenders will be deterred from committing future crime after they 
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experience a sanction personally. A perception about the costs of experiencing a 
sanction and experiencing the sanction itself are different things.  As we see from this 
study the experience of the sanction does not deter this sample of serious violent 
offenders. 
Rather than a deterrence perspective, the current results seem to provide more
support for a labeling / deviance amplification hypothesis.  Since the probability of 
recidivism increases with longer sentence lengths, perhaps the longer time spent in 
prison corresponds to a greater commitment to a deviant label / lifestyle.  
Alternatively when one examines who are the offenders who are most likely to 
receive longer sentences, it would come as not surprise that repeat offenders are more 
likely to receive longer sentences.  According to the recidivism literature repeat 
offenders, those with long criminal histories are also the group of offenders who are 
the most likely to recidivate.  Due to the limitations of the data it is impossible to 
distinguish any distinct classes of individuals who might experience sentence severity 
differently. However, due to the non-significance of the squared term in the second 
IVE estimation, there is strong evidence that there are different classes of offenders 
who experience sentence severity differently.  
Future research in addition to replicating these findings with better data may also 
investigate whether this effect holds true for all groups, or if it is different for 
experienced, versus naïve offenders such as DeJong (1997) finds in her research.  
There is one other finding of the present research that is of particular 
significance.  The relationship between sentence length and recidivism is non-linear.  
In Model 2 where a squared term was added to the equation, not only was it 
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significant, it also increased the estimate of the magnitude of the impact of sentence 
length on the probability of recidivism. That relationship was not significant in Model 
4, the IVE model.  This is possibly a result of the power of the instrument in negating 
the effect of omitted variable bias.  Despite the fact that in Model 4 the squared term 
was not significant, its addition nearly doubled the estimate of the association 
between sentence length and recidivism, from .025 to .042.  Both the models 
including the squared term predicted recidivism better than the models that did not 
have the squared term.  This clearly demonstrates that Baumer (1997) was correct 
when he hypothesized that the relationship between sentence severity and recidivism 
is not linear.  
Limitations
Though the results of this analysis are highly suggestive, they are limited. The 
sampling frame necessary to conduct this analysis limits the generalizability of the 
results to only the largest MSA’s in Pennsylvania.  Also the present analysis is 
missing a large number of key variables needed to estimate sentence length and 
recidivism.  These variables that the present study was unable to measure may be 
impacting the results for example; age may be a factor in the significant findings 
regarding the guidelines variables.  Also prior criminal history is known to have a 
significant impact on sentence length and recidivism.  Instrumental variable analysis 
is a powerful tool to account for omitted variable bias, however the use of other 
relevant predictors adds to the precision of the instrument.  When important variables 
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are left out, the model’s precision may be questioned, as is the case in the current 
study. 
Policy Implications
Based on the results of this study there is some evidence to suggest that 
increasing the length of time that individuals are sentenced for serious felonies does
increase their probability of recidivism.  This finding, if confirmed with better data 
would be a blow for specific deterrence theory and for those policy advocates who 
rely on deterrence theory to justify increased sentences for serious offenders.  The 
evidence from this study suggests that shorter sentences are the most effective in 
reducing recidivism rates.  Though implementing a policy that advocates shorter 
sentences for serious offenses would be tantamount to political suicide in a society so 
steeped in the crime control mentality, it is an avenue that would be worth 
considering if these results are replicable. 
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 Table 1. Offenses and Offense Counts
Count Description
30 Murder – Criminal Homicide
10 Murder – First Degree
5 Murder – Second Degree




11 Aggravated Assault with Serious Bodily Injury
4 Aggravated Assault with Serious Bodily Injury to Officer
6 Aggravated Assault with Deadly Weapon
5 Assault by Prisoner
407 Forcible Rape
253 Involuntary Deviant Sexual Intercourse
16 Sexual Assault
81 Aggravated Indecent Assault
88 Indecent Assault
2 Spousal Sexual Assault
1730 Burglary – General
3019 Robbery – General
28 Robbery with Serious Bodily I njury
8195 Total
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Variables
Dependent Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max
     Recidivism 8195 .19 .394 0.00 1.00
Control Variables
     Years Served 5.92 3.17 0.00 17.00
     Years Served Squared 45.25 46.37 0.00 289.00
     Minimum Sentence in Years 3.47 2.31 0.00 35.00
 MSAS























































































 (reference) Murder .00 .06 0.00 1.00
First Degree Murder .00 .04 0.00 1.00
Second Degree Murder .00 .02 0.00 1.00
Third Degree Murder .06 .23 0.00 1.00
Manslaughter .02 .14 0.00 1.00
Involuntary Manslaughter .01 .10 0.00 1.00
Aggravated Assault .21 .41 0.00 1.00
Aggravated Assault with Serious Injury .00 .04 0.00 1.00
Aggravated Assault to an Officer .00 .01 0.00 1.00
Aggravated Assault with a Deadly 
Weapon
.00 .03 0.00 1.00
Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner .00 .03 0.00 1.00
 Forcible Rape .05 .22 0.00 1.00
Involuntary Deviant Sexual Intercourse .03 .17 0.00 1.00
Sexual Assault .00 .04 0.00 1.00
Aggravated Indecent Sexual Assault .01 .11 0.00 1.00
Indecent Assault .01 .11 0.00 1.00
Spousal Sexual Assault .00 .02 0.00 1.00
Burglary .22 .41 0.00 1.00
Robbery .37 .48 0.00 1.00
Robbery with Serious Injury & Force .00 .05 0.00 1.00
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Variables (cont’d)
Offenses (cont) N Mean S.D. Min Max
Marital Status
Single .69 .46 0.00 1.00
 (reference) Married .14 .34 0.00 1.00
Separated .04 .20 0.00 1.00
Divorced .07 .26 0.00 1.00
Widowed .01 .09 0.00 1.00
Unknown .00 .04 0.00 1.00
Race
 Native American .01 .03
African American / Black .66 .48 0.00 1.00
(reference) White .24 .43 0.00 1.00
Hispanic .07 .26 0.00 1.00
Asian American .01 .07 0.00 1.00
Other .00 .03 0.00 1.00
Gender
Males .91 .29 0.00 1.00
Additional Variables
     Sentenced Under 1991 Guidelines .24 .43 0.00 1.00
Sentenced Under 1994 Guidelines .33 .47 0.00 1.00
Sentenced Under 1997 Guidelines .20 .40 0.00 1.00
69
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Judge Dummy Variables









10.81 0.50 4.71 0.43 0.15 0.07
5 29 4.86 0.26 2.29 0.17 0.18 0.07
6 20 3.25 0.25 2.33 0.28 --- ---
7 38 4.89 0.31 2.65 0.21 0.24 0.07
9 26 9.73 0.39 5.31 0.46 0.23 0.08
16 34 6.91 0.60 4.06 0.40 0.15 0.06
17 44 9.23 0.39 4.05 0.25 0.25 0.07
19 31 6.90 0.70 3.77 0.44 0.17 0.07
21 61 5.58 0.43 3.38 0.26 0.20 0.05
23 33 6.50 0.47 3.86 0.42 0.28 0.08
24 49 4.71 0.20 3.31 0.23 0.14 0.05
26 62 4.80 0.26 2.83 0.26 0.20 0.05
29 21 3.55 0.33 2.42 0.26 0.05 0.05
31 20 6.95 0.52 4.45 0.53 0.05 0.05
32 56 3.64 0.23 2.28 0.14 0.24 0.06
34 24 4.38 0.38 2.62 0.43 0.21 0.09
38 47 6.66 0.38 3.43 0.20 0.19 0.06
39 26 9.76 0.51 5.45 0.48 0.04 0.04
40 29 3.07 0.22 2.34 0.45 0.28 0.08
43 36 5.17 0.49 3.06 0.35 0.17 0.06
47 25 4.96 0.53 3.10 0.29 0.08 0.06
49 59 4.02 0.25 3.42 0.29 0.14 0.05
51 24 6.25 0.72 4.18 0.55 0.25 0.09
52 82 5.02 0.27 3.80 0.29 0.17 0.04
53 57 4.02 0.35 2.44 0.24 0.12 0.04
58 28 8.74 0.59 6.02 0.48 0.19 0.08
59 31 9.87 0.70 3.60 0.57 0.19 0.07
62 72 6.78 0.34 3.94 0.22 0.15 0.04
63 98 5.86 0.18 3.54 0.21 0.24 0.04
64 73 5.38 0.25 3.13 0.22 0.24 0.05
66 87 5.99 0.36 2.89 0.26 0.20 0.04
67 32 2.75 0.15 1.57 0.14 0.25 0.08
68 39 5.11 0.51 3.03 0.36 0.11 0.05
71 24 3.67 0.39 2.88 0.30 0.04 0.04
74 98 7.84 0.37 4.30 0.27 0.26 0.45
76 243 6.30 0.18 2.66 0.12 0.25 0.03
77 209 5.30 0.14 3.31 0.11 0.21 0.03
82 53 4.43 0.25 2.78 0.21 0.13 0.05
84 71 4.31 0.24 2.80 0.14 0.16 0.04
86 43 5.33 0.45 3.64 0.36 0.19 0.06
88 21 2.19 0.21 1.72 0.15 0.05 0.05
89 48 5.91 0.37 3.44 0.25 0.17 0.06
90 53 3.92 0.22 2.46 0.20 0.19 0.05
91 28 5.79 0.47 4.15 0.43 0.07 0.05
92 33 3.42 0.23 2.42 0.26 0.18 0.07
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95 141 5.55 0.19 3.26 0.16 0.21 0.04
104 58 6.60 0.45 4.27 0.30 0.10 0.04
105 23 6.00 0.32 3.81 0.25 0.32 0.10
106 35 6.26 0.45 3.47 3.97 0.20 0.07
107 23 10.87 0.53 5.38 0.67 0.22 0.09
108 26 5.28 0.48 3.77 0.41 0.08 0.06
109 55 3.82 0.21 2.33 0.17 0.14 0.05
110 21 5.62 0.72 3.51 0.50 0.29 0.10
111 91 4.88 0.21 3.07 0.16 0.19 0.04
112 26 4.62 0.34 2.80 0.31 0.27 0.09
113 23 7.83 0.35 4.26 0.46 0.22 0.09
114 38 5.24 0.28 3.70 0.30 0.08 0.04
115 148 7.35 0.24 3.92 0.22 0.25 0.04
117 21 6.67 1.01 2.92 0.48 0.19 0.09
118 98 10.23 0.29 5.55 0.25 0.18 0.04
119 69 11.26 0.30 6.87 0.35 0.17 0.05
120 69 2.77 0.12 1.55 0.08 0.25 0.05
122 40 4.15 0.35 2.53 0.19 0.18 0.06
123 58 7.49 0.38 3.45 0.26 0.12 0.04
128 40 3.45 0.24 2.02 0.16 0.15 0.06
129 47 4.19 0.26 2.49 0.19 0.09 0.04
130 24 3.04 0.21 2.39 0.32 0.13 0.07
132 40 9.30 0.33 4.61 0.34 0.18 0.06
133 79 7.31 0.44 5.76 0.53 0.22 0.05
135 27 7.04 0.49 4.47 0.44 0.19 0.08
137 24 3.42 0.28 2.17 0.25 0.25 0.09
139 85 6.51 0.28 4.08 0.23 0.25 0.05
142 108 6.12 0.24 3.58 0.19 0.19 0.04
143 61 5.84 0.34 3.96 0.29 0.15 0.05
144 28 4.50 0.35 2.36 0.29 0.25 0.08
146 132 4.46 0.19 2.68 0.19 0.23 0.04
147 22 2.86 0.27 2.17 0.21 0.28 0.09
148 92 4.24 0.17 2.60 0.17 0.17 0.04
150 26 3.81 0.28 2.26 0.25 0.12 0.06
153 33 4.56 0.29 2.95 0.23 0.34 0.08
155 72 11.07 0.26 4.98 0.30 0.27 0.05
157 21 2.65 0.24 1.85 0.18 0.20 0.09
158 39 7.05 0.53 5.36 0.45 0.10 0.05
160 30 6.23 0.58 3.05 0.42 0.10 0.06
161 109 4.73 0.15 2.96 0.14 0.16 0.04
163 76 5.76 0.30 3.12 0.22 0.16 0.04
164 23 2.74 0.23 1.56 0.13 0.30 0.10
167 22 4.29 0.56 3.46 0.45 0.14 0.08
170 36 5.14 0.32 3.83 0.26 0.22 0.07
171 42 5.33 0.38 2.57 0.27 0.31 0.07
172 85 6.18 0.30 3.13 0.29 0.38 0.05
175 34 8.53 0.54 3.73 0.30 0.24 0.07
176 59 4.53 0.24 2.39 0.19 0.17 0.05
177 49 6.63 0.30 2.88 0.28 0.27 0.06
178 26 5.44 0.36 2.29 0.18 0.36 0.10
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179 23 2.91 0.21 2.00 0.17 0.17 0.08
181 59 6.79 0.55 3.88 0.34 0.14 0.46
183 100 5.31 0.28 3.00 0.20 0.30 0.05
185 102 7.05 0.31 4.54 2.33 0.22 0.04
187 32 4.58 0.40 2.89 0.26 0.10 0.05
188 36 12.56 0.40 6.56 0.54 0.22 0.07
189 119 5.31 0.28 2.86 0.19 0.20 0.04
191 25 5.44 0.87 3.51 0.47 0.20 0.08
193 63 6.61 0.51 3.30 0.27 0.16 0.05
194 32 2.88 0.22 1.86 0.15 0.25 0.08
195 50 10.60 0.37 6.48 0.37 0.12 0.05
196 195 2.98 0.10 2.07 0.13 0.15 0.03
198 22 6.91 0.45 3.71 0.41 0.09 0.06
202 29 8.36 0.58 4.31 0.43 0.29 0.09
203 43 5.84 0.45 3.40 0.31 0.23 0.07
208 144 5.21 0.15 2.98 0.15 0.20 0.03
209 59 5.53 0.38 3.02 0.24 0.20 0.05
210 23 8.09 0.38 4.22 0.31 0.13 0.07
211 93 6.47 0.36 3.27 0.24 0.19 0.04
213 23 8.57 0.76 3.59 0.46 0.30 0.10
215 74 5.56 0.34 2.85 0.20 0.37 0.06
216 60 8.39 0.29 4.66 0.31 0.20 0.05
219 65 4.25 0.21 3.01 0.19 0.20 0.05
226 22 6.76 0.72 4.03 0.53 0.19 0.09
229 42 7.78 0.43 5.74 0.32 0.10 0.05
232 25 6.00 0.46 2.65 0.28 0.08 0.06
234 31 5.16 0.64 3.26 0.55 0.13 0.06
237 28 7.57 0.65 5.81 0.56 0.11 0.06
238 155 7.41 0.25 5.01 0.18 0.14 0.03
240 24 4.29 0.21 2.75 0.23 0.04 0.04
243 39 7.41 0.53 3.75 0.27 0.08 0.04
244 21 4.90 0.50 4.19 0.68 0.25 0.10
246 50 5.94 0.51 2.79 0.24 0.17 0.05
247 27 2.00 0.14 1.49 0.12 0.11 0.06
248 60 9.35 0.40 7.25 0.36 0.15 0.05
252 28 7.71 0.65 3.92 0.34 0.11 0.06
254 21 6.90 0.42 4.08 0.38 0.19 0.09
257 54 9.87 0.23 4.69 0.22 0.34 0.07
261 44 7.36 0.51 3.93 0.44 0.29 0.07
262 26 7.35 0.49 3.89 0.47 0.15 0.07
264 119 3.81 0.13 2.32 0.10 0.12 0.03
266 21 7.25 0.76 3.09 0.34 0.45 0.11
267 65 3.88 0.21 1.98 0.16 0.17 0.05
269 22 4.95 0.33 3.82 0.49 0.22 0.09
273 25 5.36 0.36 2.68 0.28 0.16 0.08
274 67 9.39 0.29 6.82 0.30 0.16 0.05
275 22 8.59 0.78 6.61 0.70 0.05 0.05
277 34 5.32 0.46 3.52 0.32 0.18 0.07
280 185 7.63 0.22 4.57 0.18 0.16 0.03
282 38 3.76 0.53 2.05 0.17 0.16 0.06
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283 40 4.83 0.50 2.78 0.30 0.18 0.06
284 85 5.76 0.23 3.88 0.19 0.13 0.04
285 43 4.12 0.29 2.31 0.24 0.19 0.06
287 31 3.61 0.22 1.94 0.15 0.26 0.08
289 34 5.82 0.45 3.33 0.35 0.24 0.07
290 26 4.83 0.51 2.97 0.45 0.33 0.10
291 25 6.76 0.69 2.28 0.24 0.36 0.10
297 67 7.71 0.37 4.14 0.21 0.24 0.05
305 26 3.62 0.28 1.94 0.12 0.12 0.06
307 23 2.43 0.19 1.49 0.13 0.26 0.09
308 32 3.90 0.33 2.80 0.33 0.33 0.09
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Table 5. OLS Regression Predicting Probability of Recidivism
Variables Model 1a Model 2b
b S.E. Sig. b S.E. Sig.
Years Served (actual) .046 .002 *** .079 .007 ***
Years Served Squared --- --- --- -.002 .000 ***
Min Sentence (years) -.017 .002 *** -.018 .003 ***
1991 Guidelines .111 .015 *** .090 .015 ***
1994 Guidelines .194 .018 *** .188 .018 ***
1997 Guidelines .216 .022 *** .237 .022 ***
Separated .007 .024 .005 .024
Divorced .014 .020 .013 .020
Widowed -.035 .048 -.027 .048
Single .004 .013 .003 .013
Unknown Marital Status .065 .113 .065 .113
Asian -.088 .159 -.087 .159
Native American .084 .147 .085 .147
Hispanic .083 .148 .082 .148
Black .095 .147 .095 .147
Other Race .001 .209 -.001 .208
Male .024 .023 .026 .023
Model R-squared .066 .069
Adjusted R-Squared .059 .063
a. Model 1 is a simple OLS regression of probability of recidivism
b. Model 2 is also OLS regression but includes the squared term to account for non-linearity
c.*** p<.05
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Table 6. First Stage Instrumental Variable Estimation Results
Variables b S.E. Sig.
Minimum Sentence in Years 0.432 0.011 ***a
1991 Guidelines -2.338 0.058 ***
1994 Guidelines -3.952 0.063 ***





Bucks -3.931 2.356 **
Centre -.161 2.365
Chester -1.997 2.247










Westmoreland -3.285 1.709 **
York -4.030 3.301
Offenses
Murder – Criminal Homicide (reference)
Murder – First Degree (dropped)
Murder – Second Degree -0.889 .872
Murder – Third Degree -0.792 .327 ***
Voluntary Manslaughter -0.186 0.340
Involuntary Manslaughter -0.717 0.362 ***
Aggravated Assault -.0421 0.315
Aggravated Assault with Serious Bodily Injury -0.448 0.580
Aggravated Assault with Serious Bodily Injury to 
Officer -0.654 0.865
Aggravated Assault with Deadly Weapon -0.627 0.730
Assault by Prisoner -0.477 0.870
Forcible Rape 0.263 0.324
Involuntary Deviant Sexual Intercourse 0.054 0.331
Sexual Assault 0.049 0.561
Aggravated Indecent Assault -0.048 0.361
Indecent Assault -0.346 0.362
Spousal Sexual Assault 0.483 1.180
Burglary – General -0.409 0.316
Robbery – General -0.342 0.315







Single -0.090 0.053 ***
Unknown Marital Status -0.236 0.470
Race
White (reference)
Native American -0.429 0.660
Asian -1.213 0.612 ***
Hispanic -0.592 0.615
Black -0.356 0.611
Other Race -0.618 0.866
Gender
Females (reference)
Males 1.890 0.093 ***
F-Statistic 105.580





Judge 5 -1.845 0.439 ***
Judge 6 -1.898 0.487 ***
Judge 7 0.088 2.237
Judge 9 -1.103 0.450 ***
Judge 11 -0.852 1.712
Judge 16 1.489 0.455 **b
Judge 17 -0.684 0.397
Judge 19 1.390 1.683
Judge 21 -1.400 1.688
Judge 22 0.067 0.468
Judge 23 (dropped)
Judge 24 -1.939 0.400 ***
Judge 26 1.618 2.352
Judge 29 -2.223 0.486 ***
Judge 31 -2.518 1.708
Judge 32 -2.414 0.388 ***
Judge 34 0.520 1.300
Judge 38 -4.097 2.835
Judge 39 -0.713 0.455
Judge 40 0.417 1.295
Judge 41 -1.739 1.703
Judge 43 -0.849 0.432 ***
Judge 47 (dropped)
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Judge 48 -0.892 1.711
Judge 49 -1.982 1.691
Judge 51 -1.733 1.710
Judge 52 -1.968 0.368 ***
Judge 53 -4.723 2.854 **
Judge 58 -1.418 0.445 ***
Judge 59 0.612 1.701
Judge 62 -1.347 0.372 ***
Judge 63 -1.695 0.358 ***
Judge 64 -1.602 0.370 ***
Judge 66 0.059 0.336 ***
Judge 67 -1.994 0.437 ***
Judge 68 -3.227 0.805 ***
Judge 69 -1.656 1.716
Judge 71 -3.249 1.697 **
Judge 74 -0.939 1.684
Judge 76 -1.596 0.334 ***
Judge 77 -1.659 0.338 ***
Judge 81 -0.558 0.385
Judge 82 -4.478 2.855
Judge 84 -1.934 1.686
Judge 85 -1.424 1.700
Judge 86 -0.686 2.235
Judge 88 (dropped)
Judge 89 -4.386 2.855
Judge 90 -5.469 3.475
Judge 91 -0.405 2.242
Judge 92 -2.360 0.429 ***
Judge 95 -1.846 0.347 ***
Judge 97 1.664 2.369
Judge 98 0.776 0.488
Judge 99 (dropped)
Judge 100 (dropped)
Judge 101 -1.232 1.716
Judge 104 0.652 1.644
Judge 105 1.277 2.368
Judge 106 -0.870 1.521
Judge 107 -0.562 0.458
Judge 108 -0.171 2.246
Judge 109 -2.304 0.390 ***
Judge 110 0.636 0.501
Judge 111 -1.869 0.361 ***
Judge 112 -1.324 0.456 ***
Judge 113 -1.148 0.461 ***
Judge 114 -1.704 0.416 ***
Judge 115 -1.469 0.343 ***
Judge 117 -2.128 1.629
Judge 118 -0.875 0.356 ***
Judge 119 -0.507 0.370
Judge 120 -2.000 0.381 ***
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Judge 122 -2.925 1.683 **
Judge 123 -1.326 0.383 ***
Judge 128 -5.854 3.477 **
Judge 129 -4.946 2.855 ***
Judge 130 -2.012 0.482 ***
Judge 132 -1.161 0.404 ***
Judge 133 -1.002 0.372 ***
Judge 135 -2.068 1.705
Judge 137 -2.746 1.694
Judge 139 -1.427 0.364 ***
Judge 142 -1.405 0.355 ***
Judge 143 -2.669 1.674
Judge 144 0.164 1.296
Judge 146 0.380 1.275
Judge 147 -5.083 2.868 **
Judge 148 -1.739 0.363 ***
Judge 150 -5.466 3.484
Judge 153 -2.698 1.685
Judge 155 -0.029 0.370
Judge 157 -2.180 0.487 ***
Judge 158 -1.881 0.415 ***
Judge 160 -2.611 0.815 ***
Judge 161 -2.053 0.354 ***
Judge 163 -1.739 0.368 ***
Judge 164 -1.586 0.469 ***
Judge 167 -2.005 0.486 ***
Judge 168 -5.539 3.487
Judge 170 -2.128 0.420 ***
Judge 171 -5.404 3.467
Judge 172 -1.207 1.685
Judge 175 -1.594 0.809 ***
Judge 176 0.232 1.267
Judge 177 -0.956 1.692
Judge 178 -1.239 0.456 ***
Judge 179 -0.725 1.542
Judge 181 -1.418 0.387 ***
Judge 183 -1.556 1.683
Judge 185 -1.619 0.355 ***
Judge 187 0.106 0.441
Judge 188 0.825 0.416 ***
Judge 189 -1.548 1.682
Judge 191 1.159 2.318
Judge 193 -0.993 1.688
Judge 194 -1.837 0.436 ***
Judge 195 -0.852 0.392 ***
Judge 196 -2.120 0.343 ***
Judge 198 -1.590 1.712
Judge 202 -4.538 3.481
Judge 203 -5.122 3.476
Judge 208 -1.860 0.346 ***
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Judge 209 -2.806 0.780 ***
Judge 210 -2.145 0.464 ***
Judge 211 -0.938 1.684
Judge 213 -0.776 1.709
Judge 215 -1.360 1.686
Judge 216 -1.345 0.380 ***
Judge 219 -1.854 1.688
Judge 226 0.077 2.248
Judge 229 -1.618 0.409 ***
Judge 231 -3.600 2.312
Judge 232 0.390 1.296
Judge 234 -0.361 2.308
Judge 237 -1.610 0.445 ***
Judge 238 -1.402 0.348 ***
Judge 240 -1.046 1.534
Judge 243 -1.294 1.696
Judge 244 -3.589 0.851 ***
Judge 246 -2.665 0.798 ***
Judge 247 -1.960 0.454 ***
Judge 248 -1.305 0.387 ***
Judge 252 -1.863 1.630
Judge 254 -1.913 1.697
Judge 257 -0.969 0.386 ***
Judge 261 0.809 1.262
Judge 262 0.921 1.307
Judge 264 -1.925 0.354 ***
Judge 266 -2.296 0.841 ***
Judge 267 -1.841 0.377 ***
Judge 268 -0.309 0.487
Judge 269 0.385 1.315
Judge 273 0.315 2.244
Judge 274 -1.534 0.372 ***
Judge 275 -1.141 0.469 ***
Judge 277 -0.829 1.524
Judge 280 -1.370 0.338 ***
Judge 282 -2.854 1.682 **
Judge 283 -2.368 0.790 ***
Judge 284 -1.936 0.363 ***
Judge 285 -5.466 3.476
Judge 287 -4.446 2.861
Judge 289 -2.883 0.809 ***
Judge 290 -0.965 0.462 ***
Judge 291 0.771 2.350
Judge 297 -1.096 0.376 ***
Judge 305 -2.609 1.691
Judge 307 -2.017 0.482 ***




Table 7. Second Stage Instrumental Variables Estimation Results
Variables Model 3c Model 4d
b S.E. Sig. b S.E. Sig.
Years Served (Predicted) .028 .011 *** .042 .016 ***
Years Served Squared (Predicted) --- --- --- -.001 .000
Min Sentence in Years -.009 .005 ** -.009 .005 **
1991 Guidelines .061 .031 ** .060 .031 **
1994 Guidelines .114 .048 *** .121 .049 ***
1997 Guidelines .112 .074 ** .132 .065 ***
Separated .007 .024 .006 .024
Divorced .015 .020 .015 .019
Widowed -.030 .049 -.031 .048
Single .003 .013 .003 .012
Unknown Marital Status .031 .111 .062 .110
Native American .074 .141 .077 .150
Asian -.108 .061 -.103 .162
Hispanic .070 .019 .073 .151
Black .086 .012 .089 .150
Other Race -.008 .141 -.004 .213
Male .060 .031 ** .056 .032 **
Model R-squared .0315 .0316
Adjusted R-Squared .0250 .0250
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Figure 3. OLS Regressions for Model 1 and Model 210




























OLS Model 1 OLS Squared Model 2
10  All other variables are held constant at the means in this and subsequent graphs.
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Figure 4. IVE Regressions for Model 3 and Model 4

























IVE Model 3 IVE Squared Model 4
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Figure 5.  Comparison of Both Equations including the Squared Terms
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